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I. INTRODUCTION
Creditors distrust debtors and other creditors. Some of this in-
security is dispelled by the two basic priority rules--"first in time"
for secured credit and pro rata sharing for general credit. These
priorities, however, are merely suppletive rules that replicate what
most creditors want.' Individual creditors can have different objec-
tives that call for different priorities. For that reason, creditors
vary their rights by contract.'
Two motives exist for subordination agreements. First, a cred-
itor may wish to subordinate its priority to induce another creditor
1. Some commentators believe that liquidation priorities duplicate what the creditors
would agree to if preliquidation bargaining were possible. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 871 (1982); Jack-
son & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143,
1157 (1979); Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditor's Rights in Reorganization: A
Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96
HARV. L. REV. 973, 994 (1983). The most typical priority rule in consensual lien sys-
tems-first in time is first in right-is explained as an attempt to protect the creditor from
the debtor's misbehavior in dissipating his wealth. Jackson & Kronman, supra, at 1162-63.
When the creditor is comparatively unskilled in preventing this misbehavior by monitoring
and policing, creditors efficiently may take security under a "first in time" regime, leaving
the general task of policing the debtor to those better able to do it. Id. at 1158-61. But see
Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49
(1983) (arguing that the most efficient monitors take security).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1982); U.C.C. § 9-316 (1977).
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to advance new funds. Second, a junior creditor may wish to ad-
vance credit, but the resulting increased leverage of the debtor
would violate a covenant in a loan agreement between the debtor
and some other creditor. A subordinated debt may be the only
kind of debt that does not violate the covenant of a senior
creditor.3
Governance of remote contingencies within the remote contin-
gency of the debtor's liquidation is often too costly. Hence, subor-
dination agreements are often vague and incomplete. When finan-
cial disaster strikes, courts are called upon to fill in the omissions
left by the contract. The best way for courts to fill in these con-
tractual gaps is by reference to the economics of the basic subordi-
nation relationship among creditors.
This subordination analysis currently does not exist. The sem-
inal article in the field5 has stated that a theory of subordination
does not matter, providing the agreement is enforced.' The disdain
for exploring the structure of the subordination relationship in
that article may have deterred the courts from making this in-
quiry.7 As a result courts have not been solving interpretation dis-
3. The basic priority in bankruptcy is pro rata sharing between general creditors. This
priority also is described as a suppletive rule based on what most creditors want. Pro rata
sharing guarantees that no single creditor will attempt to collect its debt from an insolvent
debtor at the expense of other creditors. Jackson, supra note 1, at 869.
4. See generally Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUm. L. REv.
860 (1968) (commenting on filling in terms omitted from the text of contracts).
5. Calligar, Subordination Agreements, 70 YALE L.J. 376 (1961).
6. Calligar stated that four different theories have been advanced to explain why
bankruptcy courts are willing to enforce collateral agreements between creditors: subordina-
tion agreements create equitable assignments, equitable liens, or constructive trusts; or are
merely contractual obligations enforced by a bankruptcy court on no particular theory. Of
these theories, Calligar stated: "Each . . . is conclusionary; they are ways of rationalizing,
rather than reaching, a desired result. In total, they show a general willingness on the part
of the courts to find a legal reason to enforce subordination agreements." Id. at 389.
7. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1966).
Congress has underscored the need for an examination of the structure of subordination
relationships in § 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, which provides, "a subordination
agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that such agreement is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1982). Professor Gil-
more, who wrote with his usual intelligence on subordination, predicted in 1965 "that the
focus of litigation will shift to the 'true nature' of the senior-subordinator relationship." 2 G.
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 37.3, at 995 (1965); see also Chase
Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1047 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Until the trier
of fact characterizes the subordination agreement executed by these parties, he cannot begin
to answer the questions posed by ... the written agreement."). The Chase Manhattan
court confessed that it was perplexed by the distinction between subordination and assign-
ments for security. Id.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
putes consistently with the dynamics of subordination.
This Article examines the nature of voluntary subordination of
lien and bankruptcy priorities. Part II briefly addresses the judicial
role in determining the meaning of subordination agreements. Part
III will demonstrate that all aspects of the agreement to
subordinate debt (but not agreements to subordinate lien priority)
derive from the junior creditor's simple core promise. The junior
creditor promises that, after a point in time, he will receive no pay-
ment from the debtor on the junior claim until the senior creditors
are paid. From this core promise, courts can build a jurisprudence
that is consistent with the economics of consensual subordination.
Part IV will show that every promise not to receive payment
on the junior debt is a transfer of ownership (an "assignment") of
the junior claim from the subordinated lender to the senior credi-
tors. Subordination of debt (but not of lien priority) bridges the
gap between the junior creditor's personal obligation and the en-
cumbrance of the junior creditor's property. The shift from the
junior creditor's personal obligation to the transfer of the junior
creditor's property protects senior creditors from the junior credi-
tor's bankruptcy or other misbehavior. This is an important con-
sideration because the junior creditor is frequently an insider of
the common debtor. Recognition that subordination of the junior
claim is an assignment by a nonrecourse guarantor in order to se-
cure the senior claim8 will permit courts to expropriate many use-
ful doctrines pertaining to assignment of choses in action.
While a creditor that subordinates its debt transfers owner-
ship of the debt, the secured creditor that subordinates lien prior-
ity (without the core promise not to receive payment on the debt
itself) transfers no property. Contractual lien subordination is like
any junior lien priority-the obligation to stand aside from the
trough while senior creditors drink their fill according to their
priorities.9
The above propositions run contrary to the vast weight of au-
thority. The Second Circuit, the nation's preeminent commercial
8. The Second Circuit recently described the nonrecourse guarantor relationship:
A non-recourse clause normally is intended to reduce the risks to the party granting
the security interest if the secured party is later forced to foreclose on the security. By
precluding the secured party from getting a deficiency judgment against him, the
debtor contains the risk of loss to the security alone ....
Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 735 F.2d 740, 742 (2d Cir. 1984) (cita-
tion omitted).
9. Lien subordination can be equated with waiver of the right to repossess and sell the
collateral. See infra text accompanying notes 166-81.
[Vol. 38:975
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forum, has reached opposite conclusions: subordination of debt is
not an assignment, 10 and subordination of lien priority is an as-
signment of the security interest held by the junior creditor.1 Be-
cause assignees of secured debt usually can rely on the perfecting
acts of the assignor,' 2 the categorization of lien subordination as
assignment permits an assignee that has not itself perfected its se-
curity interest to survive the debtor's bankruptcy. Two prestigious
works on subordination concur that debt subordination is not an
assignment of the debt'- and that lien subordination is an assign-
ment.14 This Article will argue that these authorities have a mis-
taken view of subordination.
Finally, part V will show that, contrary to the assumptions of
the blue chip bar, contingent debt subordination is substantially
worthless. At least in the American Bar Association (ABA) stan-
dard forms, unvested subordination rights can be amended away if
the junior creditors and the common debtor choose to do so. Thus,
the ABA form provides an opportunity for instant wealth transfer
from the seniors to the juniors that senior creditors can prevent
only by enforceable refunding prohibitions. A weird corollary is
that, providing subordination rights are still contingent, the junior
creditor may receive security for its subordinated loan. This leaves
the loan simultaneously secured and subordinated. This anomaly is
appropriate, provided the junior creditor receives security at a
time when its claim could have been prepaid.
II. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN DETERMINING THE MEANING OF
SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS
In the reported cases on subordination agreements courts usu-
ally are asked to fill in omitted terms. This should be no surprise.
The cost of negotiating these agreements often will outweigh the
benefits of formulating rules for remote contingencies.
The parties can reduce these costs by recourse to standard
forms. 15 Since invention costs for these forms are now sunk, their
10. See First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); Cherno v. Dutch Am. Mercantile Corp., 353 F.2d 147, 150-
51 (2d Cir. 1965).
11. See Citibank, N.A. v. Tele/Resources, Inc., 724 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1983).
12. U.C.C. § 9-302(2) (1977).
13. See Calligar, supra note 5, at 395-96.
14. See Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination
Agreements, Security Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses and Par-
ticipation Agreements, 79 HARv. L. REV. 229, 234 n.20, 259-61 (1965).
15. See, e.g., Model Simplified Indenture, § 11.01-.08, 38 Bus. LAW. 741, 769-70 (1983)
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use in future deals is highly efficient. Lawyers also can use forms to
overrule disfavored judicial opinions interpreting prior language.
This greatly reduces the long term judicial damage done by courts
to stylized and repetitive loan agreements.16
The standardization of forms for large loans does not absolve
courts from the need to understand the basic relation between jun-
ior and senior creditors. The large number of recent subordination
cases suggests new disputes unanticipated by the investment in-
dustry can spring up even when the parties use these forms.
Judges who decide wrongly may be unable to cause long term dam-
age, but, even in the short term, no judge wants to impose a loss
unfairly on the individual parties to an agreement. Moreover, a ju-
dicial decision concerning one standard-form loan could affect the
market value of all similar debt instruments.17 In addition, as the
size of the deal shrinks, the parties become less sophisticated re-
garding the standard forms.18 Under time pressure, even sophisti-
cated lawyers can draft poor agreements. 19 The advance sheets in-
clude enough of these events to justify a more satisfactory theory
of consensual subordination relations between senior and junior
creditors.
The role of the courts in settling subordination agreement dis-
putes does not differ from the courts' general role in interpreting
contracts. If the parties have formed an expectation about the
meaning of an agreement, the court's role is to find and to effect
that expectation. Because of expense, negotiators cannot form ex-
pectations on every conceivable event. Failure to form an expecta-
tion is especially common in subordination agreements in which
the subject of the agreement is the "remote contingency" of the
(§ 11.01-.08).
16. One author, writing on convertible bonds, documented how lawyers overruled dis-
favored judicial opinions with revised boilerplate language in standard forms. Bratton, The
Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 667, 718-19. The
tendency of the financial bar to engage in this practice is evidence that the original judicial
decisions misperceived the allocation of risks assumed at the marketplace. Id. at 723; see
also Bratton, The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, 5
CARDOZO L. REv. 371, 378-79 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Interpretation of Contracts].
17. Bratton, supra note 16, at 708-10.
18. For a truly incomprehensible agreement, see Peoples Bank & Trust v. Reiff, 256
N.W.2d 336 (N.D. 1977). In this case, the trial and appellate courts disagreed on which
party was the junior creditor and which was the senior creditor.
19. For a Wall Street associate's nightmare, see Chase Manhattan Bank v. First
Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1971), in which lawyers for the senior creditors in-
serted subordination clause into an intracreditor preference agreement that was limited to
12 months.
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debtor's liquidation.20
When the parties form no expectations, courts resort to many
different methods to decide cases. Courts investigate the relations
between the parties and develop rules that comport with the pur-
pose of the relationship. If such inquiries fail to suggest an answer,
then courts often resort to "rules of thumb," or place the drafting
burden on the plaintiff. These crude methods do not purport to
find the parties' expectations, nor do they explore the purpose of
the relationship, but they effectively dispose of cases.
Courts should use this last type of method only when the ex-
ploration of the relations between the litigants fails to suggest an
answer. In cases concerning subordination agreements, however,
courts have resorted to these methods without making a proper
exploration of the litigants' relations. In First National Bank v.
American Foam Rubber Corp.,21 the junior creditor deprived the
senior creditor of the junior creditor's dividends in bankruptcy by
exchanging debt for stock. The Second Circuit decided the case
without exploring the nature of subordination. Instead, the court
imposed the drafting burden on the senior creditor. The court held
the action taken by the junior creditor and debtor to be consistent
with the contract because the agreement expressly did not bar
such action. If the court had understood the nature of the subordi-
nation agreement, a different result would have been reached. 2
A description of the basic contractual subordination relation
follows. Individual creditor's expectations may differ, but the pur-
poses of subordination should be the same in a majority of cases.
There should be a presumption in favor of using the suppletive
rules that will be developed, rebuttable only if it is very clear that
the parties have developed contrary expectations.
20. See First Nat'I Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d 450, 456 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976).
21. Id.
22. The court characterized the First National Bank case as a "discharge" case, but
the junior debt was traded for stock. The court should have determined that the senior
creditor became the owner of the stock. In addition, to the extent the stock was not a fair
exchange (i.e., to the extent the transaction was a true discharge), the junior creditors
should have been liable in damages to the senior creditor for breach of the assignor's duty to
take no action to defeat a presently effective assignment of the junior debt. See infra note
195.
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III. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROMISE IN A DEBT SUBORDINATION
AGREEMENT
The subordination clause in the ABA Model Simplified Inden-
ture2 s imposes the following obligation on junior creditors: (1) Af-
ter a certain point,2 the junior creditor promises not to receive
payment from the debtor until the senior creditors are paid. (2) If
the junior creditor does receive payment after that point-"an im-
proper payment"-the model indenture deems the junior creditor
to hold it "in trust" for the senior creditor.2 5 (3) In the common
debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, any dividends payable to the jun-
ior creditor instead should be payable to the senior creditors-the
assignment idea.2 6  The senior creditors receive "double divi-
dends ' 27 because, in addition to the usual dividends allocable to
the senior claim against the debtor, the senior creditors receive the
junior creditor's dividends as well. (4) After the senior creditors
recover their claims against the debtor, the right to receive junior
dividends reverts back to the junior creditor. In addition, the jun-
23. Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 15, at 769-70 (§ 11.01-.08).
24. The critical point is the time the junior creditor is notified of default on the senior
debt. Id. (§ 11.04).
25. Id. at 770 (§ 11.06). The word "trust" should mean only that the senior creditor is
to have a proprietary interest in the improper payment. Use of the term "trust" should not
mean that the senior creditor has an "equitable" property interest in the improper payment.
For the meaning of "equitable" as applied to property concepts, see text accompanying
notes 96-104.
26. Id. at 769 ( 11.03).
27. First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 306 F. Supp. 593, 601 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); In re
Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F. Supp. 107, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), af'd sub nom. Elias v.
Clarke, 143 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 778 (1944); 2 G. GILMoRE, supra note 7,
at 985-86; Calligar, supra note 5, at 377; see also Cohn, Subordinated Claims: Their Classi-
fication and Voting Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 A. BANKR. L.J. 293,
295-96 (1982).
The phrase "double dividends" must not be taken literally. Double dividends will be
exactly double only when the junior and senior claims are equal in size and priority.
Double dividends can be a valuable right. See Citibank, N.A. v. Baer, 651 F.2d 1341,
1345 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980) (reorganization securities worth $6,000,000 given to supplement
senior creditors' share); In re W.T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53, 58-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(double dividends of $95,378,373), aff'd, 20 Bankr. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 699 F.2d 599
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983). In W.T. Grant the dividend amount was equal
to the face value of all subordinated debentures. Meanwhile, other creditors were receiving
dividends of less than 50%. In re W.T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 596, 607 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1978). One would have thought that ratio of junior dividend to face value of junior
debt would have equated with the ratio of general dividend to the total general debt. Ac-
cording to the bankruptcy court the 100% junior dividend was designed to protect the jun-
ior debenture holders from the compromise and settlement of all nonjunior claims. Id. at
605.
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ior creditors become subrogated to any further bankruptcy divi-
dends that the senior creditors are entitled to receive. This subro-
gation clause guarantees that the junior creditor will receive double
dividends after the senior creditors are paid out.28
The above obligations make subordination agreements rela-
tively easy for a bankruptcy court to administer-providing the
parties do not try some unusual ploy to increase their take or avoid
their obligations. Courts, however, have gone awry when some of
the above promises are not expressly set forth. This Article posits
that the above contractual clauses from the Model Simplified In-
denture all derive from the core promise not to receive payment on
the junior debt until the senior creditors are paid. When these
clauses are not explicitly set forth in a subordination agreement,
courts should infer them because they are consistent with the eco-
nomic purposes of subordination.
A. The Promise to Receive No Payment as an Assignment of
Bankruptcy Dividends
A junior creditor may make its promise to receive no payment
immediately effective, or it may defer effectiveness until some con-
tingency occurs. When a subordination promise is immediately ef-
fective, it is a "complete subordination"-a term that suggests a
complete lack of contingencies regarding the core promise.2 ' When
a subordination promise not to receive payment is contingent on a
future event of default-such as violation of a net capital ratio or
the common debtor's bankruptcy-it is a contingent
subordination. °
The simple promise to receive no payment before senior credi-
28. Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 15, at 770 (§ 11.08).
29. See Calligar, supra note 5, at 381.
30. Calligar termed any subordination duty contingent on the debtor's bankruptcy to
be an "inchoate" subordination. Calligar, supra note 5, at 377. The term "inchoate" inap-
propriately suggests that the agreement creates no rights before the contingency occurs.
Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, supra note 14, at 234 n.20 ("this term is misleading because it
suggests that something further has to be done in order to make the subordination good
against the [junior] creditors"); Everett, Subordinated Debt-Nature, Objectives and En-
forcement, 44 B.U.L. REv. 487, 491 n.9 (1965); see Charles W. & Ruby W. Norton, Inc., v.
Leadville Corp., 570 F.2d 911, 912 (10th Cir. 1978) ("inchoateness" equated with
unenforceability).
Calligar had no term for a subordination agreement in which the promise to receive no
payment was not immediately effective but was effective earlier than the debtor's bank-
ruptcy. In this Article, these agreements are called "contingent subordinations." This new
terminology is consistent with the Article's emphasis on the junior creditor's promise not to
receive payment until the senior creditors are paid as the essence of debt subordination.
1985] 983
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tors, regardless of whether it is a complete or contingent subordi-
nation, translates into the double dividend system described in the
Model Simplified Indenture, a proposition that courts generally
have recognized.3 1 The superiority of the double dividend system
becomes apparent upon consideration of the effect of withholding
bankruptcy dividends from the junior creditor without assigning
them to the senior creditor.32
When the debtor's estate is liquidated, all further opportunity
for creditors to obtain repayment from the debtor disappears. If
subordination means only that the junior creditor is denied a share
of the bankrupt's estate until the senior creditors are paid, consis-
tent with the literal words of the core promise, more of the estate
is available to satisfy the senior creditor's claim. But more also is
available to satisfy nonsenior claims. Absent an assignment of divi-
dends to the senior creditor, ordinary creditors benefit to exactly
the same extent as the senior creditors, and the contractual lan-
guage identifying specific senior creditors is superfluous. For the
senior creditor to get any special benefit in bankruptcy from the
subordination clause, an assignment of double dividends, barring
unusual contractual language, must be presumed.3
While double dividends provide the senior creditors with
more, these dividends actually cost the junior creditors less. For
example, in a large bankruptcy with numerous creditors and fifty
31. See In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 412 (2d Cir. 1966) ("Any reference to
bankruptcy proceedings would have been superfluous in view of the broad terms of the
[complete] subordination provisions."); Cherno v. Dutch Am. Mercantile Corp., 353 F.2d
147, 154 (2d Cir. 1965); In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 16 F.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1926)
(what appeared to be a complete subordination translated into an "equitable lien" on the
junior creditor's bankruptcy dividends); First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp.,
306 F. Supp. 593, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); In re Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 97
(W.D. La. 1932). Only one older case held a contrary position. See In re Goodman-Kinstler
Cigar Co., 32 Am. Bankr. Rep. 624 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1914).
32. Withholding dividends shall be termed the "demotion" theory. The "demotion"
theory is in the nature of a waiver of rights and is the alternative to an assignment theory.
While the demotion theory is inappropriate for debt subordination, it should be the opera-
tive theory for lien subordination. See infra text accompanying notes 171-81.
33. See Wyse v. Pioneer-Cafeteria Feeds, Ltd., 340 F.2d 719, 723 (6th Cir. 1965) ("It is
to be noted, however, that the enforcement of subordination agreements between creditors
of the same bankrupt affects only their rights and does not interfere with or change the
rights of other creditors."); In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 16 F.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y 1926);
In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F. Supp. 107, 114 (S.D.N.Y 1943) (double dividends
approved specifically to exclude nonsenior creditors), af'd sub nom. Elias v. Clarke, 143
F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 778 (1944). In one case, the court noted that there
ought to be a difference between senior and nonsenior debt and asked the referee to take
evidence on the matter. See In re Discon Corp., 346 F. Supp. 839, 845 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
[Vol. 38:975
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percent dividends or more, a general demotion of a junior creditor
guarantees no return on its claim and perhaps only the slightest
increase on the return of all the other creditors. A double dividend
system, however, will provide the junior creditor partial repayment
when the senior debt is less than half the size of the junior debt.
Double dividends are lucrative for the senior creditor, cheaper for
the junior creditor, and essentially free for the common debtor,
and thus should be an important element in all debt
subordinations.
Double dividends are also more efficient than general demo-
tion because they lower the aggregate cost of credit to the common
debtor. When the purpose of subordination is to induce new
credit,3 4 double dividends provide security to the senior creditor.
Security lowers the risk of the loan and hence lowers the price that
the senior creditor will charge.3 5 A general demotion theory pro-
vides less security. The price of a senior loan under such a rule
must reflect the risk that subsequent creditors can expropriate the
subordination benefit. A general demotion theory, therefore, does
not have the favorable effect on the price of senior credit that
double dividends would have.36
A general demotion theory probably will not lower the cost of
nonsenior credit enough to counterbalance the above costs imposed
upon the senior and junior creditors. Preexisting nonsenior credi-
tors have no opportunity to lower the cost of new credit. Hence,
general demotion transfers wealth to preexisting creditors for free.
Furthermore, postsubordination creditors will have no incentive to
lower the price of their loans to the common debtor in light of ex-
isting subordination benefits. Each creditor extending credit under
a general demotion theory of subordination must discount the sub-
ordination benefit by the probability that its value will be diluted
by the issuance of subsequent debt. Hence, a general demotion
theory of subordination will have only a fraction of the cost reduc-
ing effect that double dividends would have. A double dividend
theory limits the security to creditors that can lower the cost of
34. On the two motives for subordinating a debt claim, see supra text accompanying
notes 2-3.
35. On the relation between risk and price of a loan, see Carlson & Shupack, Judicial
Lien Priorities Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part 1, 5 CARDozo L.
REv. 287, 307-09 (1984).
36. The threat of future expropriation of collateral by subsequent creditors is the jus-
tification for the "first in time first in right" rule that prevails in commercial law. See Jack-
son & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1161-64.
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their loans. A general demotion theory forces a division of the se-
curity with free riders and provides no protection against subse-
quent debtor misbehavior.
In addition to the inducement of new senior credit, the desire
to avoid debt restrictions imposed by preexisting debt covenants
also can motivate junior creditors to subordinate their claims.
Double dividends for those entitled to enforce preexisting debt
covenants can be characterized as a benefit not anticipated in set-
ting the price of the senior loan. As such, double dividends are a
benefit for which the senior creditor did not pay.3 7 The free ride
for senior creditors, however, is less costly to the junior creditor
than the free ride under a general demotion theory. 8 Therefore,
junior creditors would prefer an interpretation of subordination
agreements that requires double dividends instead of general
demotion.
Every promise not to receive payment before the senior credi-
tors are paid should result in double dividends and should prevent
general creditors from receiving a windfall in the debtor's bank-
ruptcy. The promise not to receive prebankruptcy payment until
specified senior debts are paid, however, benefits all general credi-
tors because the senior creditor takes no immediate rights to pay-
ment. Only the debtor's liquidation-when junior dividends must
be disposed of one way or another-activates the senior creditor's
rights. The promise of the junior creditor to forego prebankruptcy
payment merely enhances the debtor's estate to the equal benefit
of senior and nonsenior creditors. In this respect, the junior credi-
tor's promise to receive no payment is like a covenant by the
debtor against further debt. Each type of promise renders the
debtor's credit less risky. Preexisting creditors receive a windfall
because these covenants render their claims less risky, but subse-
quent creditors may perceive less risk and may tend to offer lower
interest rates.
37. The creditor with a debt restriction covenant cannot always count on the issuance
of subordinated debt to generate double dividends. Later issuance of the debt is, therefore,
frequently a windfall. The restrictive covenant itself, however, tends to reduce the price of
the senior claim. But the basis for the lower price-reduced risk of a dissipating asset
base-is served as well by a general demotion theory as by a double dividends theory.
The senior creditor with a covenant to enforce also suffers an increased risk because
subordinated debt makes the debtor more highly leveraged. Arguably double dividends are
not a free ride because they are paid for by permission to increase the leverage of the com-
mon debtor. If double dividends do not create a free rider problem in this context, the
argument for preferring double dividends over general demotion is even stronger.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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B. Derivation of the Subrogation Clause
The subrogation clause in the standard form subrogates the
junior creditor to the right to future senior dividends after the sen-
ior claims have been satisfied by senior and junior dividends. The
junior creditor then receives "double dividends,"39 arising from the
senior creditor's subrogation rights. This allows the junior claim to
catch up with the nonsenior claims that have continued to receive
bankruptcy dividends at an even rate.
The basic subordination relation demands that a subrogation
right be inferred even when such a right is not explicit in the
agreement.40 The consequences of not awarding the junior creditor
double dividends after the satifaction of senior claims illustrates
why.
After a bankruptcy court fully pays a senior creditor from
double dividends, it has three choices regarding the remaining div-
idends payable on the senior debt. The court can: (a) Overpay the
senior creditor; (b) dismiss the senior creditor and retain the divi-
dends in the bankrupt's estate for the general creditors; or (c) pay
excess dividends to the junior creditor, thus providing the junior
creditor with double dividends. Further enrichment of the senior
creditor as in alternative (a) would violate the probable expecta-
tions of the parties. Generally the parties contemplate assignment
of bankruptcy dividends as security for the senior debt, not as an
outright "sale" of the junior debt. The core promise not to receive
payment until the senior creditors are paid directly contradicts the
first of these three options.4 1 Alternative (b) calls for the bank-
39. See Allegaert v. Chemical Bank, 657 F.2d 495, 498-99 n.2 (2d Cir. 1980); Model
Simplified Indenture, supra note 15, at 770 (Q 11.08).
40. Although few bankruptcies result in general creditors receiving 100% satisfaction
of their claims, the phenomenon is not unknown. In re Nova Real Estate Inv. Trust, 30
Bankr. 347 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983); Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy:
The Role of the State, 41 LAW & CoNrEM. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 13, 32-33. The remote
possibility of complete satisfaction is not the only reason a comprehensive subrogation the-
ory for subordination agreements is necessary. Subrogation could arise when the senior debt
is small and the junior debt is large. For example, if $1000 in junior debt is subordinated to
$100 of senior debt, and each creditor receives 50% on its claim, the junior creditor initially
receives a $500 dividend. The senior creditor initially receives a $50 dividend. Sufficient
junior dividends would be assigned over to the senior creditor ($50) in order to satisfy the
senior claim. Thus, after the first distribution, the senior creditor receives $100, while the
junior creditor receives $450. If there is a subsequent distribution of 10% on all general
claims, the junior creditor would receive an additional $100. It also is subrogated to the five
dollars the senior creditor would have received if the senior creditor had not been paid fully.
Thus, in the second distribution, the junior creditor would receive $105-a higher pro rata
amount than other general creditors would receive.
41. A different issue on the size of the senior claim is whether the senior debt includes
1985] 987
988 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:975
ruptcy court to retain all future dividends on the senior debt for
the benefit of all general creditors. When the subordination agree-
ment names specific senior creditors, however, the junior creditor
that consents to the double dividend system ordinarily will intend
no benefit to the nonsenior creditors.42 The junior creditor's pur-
pose is to induce new credit or to steer clear of senior covenants
against new debt. Avoidance of free rides dictated creation of the
double dividend system.43 The same reason dictates the creation of
a subrogation right after the senior creditor is paid. Under alterna-
tive (c), the only choice left, the bankruptcy court pays back senior
the senior creditor's postbankruptcy interest claims against the common debtor. Postban-
kruptcy interest is not an allowable claim in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1982). But see
id. § 726(a)(5) (creditors receive postbankruptcy interest at the legal rate if all other credi-
tors have been paid). Junior creditors can agree that the senior creditors should receive
compensation for loss of senior postbankruptcy interest from junior bankruptcy dividends.
See Bankers Life Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 514 F.2d 400, 401 n.2 (2d Cir.
1975).
In the three leading cases on this issue, the subordination agreements indicated that the
junior creditor could not receive payment until principal and interest on the senior claim
were paid in full. In re King Resources Co., 528 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1976); Bankers Life
Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 514 F.2d 400, 401 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Time Sales
Fin. Corp., 491 F.2d 841, 842 (3d Cir. 1974). But these courts concluded that the senior
creditors had not been sufficiently clear in defining the senior debt to include postban-
kruptcy interest. Cf. In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768, 770 (2d Cir. 1938)
(placing drafting burden on junior creditor regarding intent to exclude interest from junior
claim). The reasoning of these courts is associational, not logical. The senior creditor cannot
recover postbankruptcy interest against the common debtor on a general unsecured claim,
but it is not the debtor who pays postbankruptey interest in this case. It is the junior credi-
otr who pays with junior creditor property. Also, a senior creditor can recover its secured
postbankruptcy interest to the extent of the collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982). The junior
debt itself is collateral for the senior debt. See infra text accompanying notes 72-153. If the
junior creditor were bankrupt at the same time as the common debtor, the junior creditor's
trustee would have to award postbankruptcy interest to the senior creditor out of the collat-
eral. Id. Why should the rule be different when the junior creditor is solvent?
Subordination is the assignment of a chose in action by a nonrecourse guarantor. The
usual motivation in suretyship is to guarantee the repayment of the entire senior claim. The
motivation to guarantee the entire senior claim also motivates parties to a subordination
agreement. Placing the drafting burden on the senior creditors is less likely to replicate the
parties' expectations, especially when the senior claim broadly includes all interest claims.
Cf. Citibank, N.A. v. Smith Jones, Inc., 17 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (broadly
phrased subordination agreement covered senior creditor's postbankruptcy advances).
Further evidence against the proposed solution of the above cited cases is the inclusion
of postbankruptcy interest in the standard forms definition of the senior debt. Model Sim-
plified Indenture, supra note 15, at 1169 (§ 11.03(1)). The standard forms represent typical
market expectations of debt covenants. Bratton, supra note 16, at 718-19. Therefore, in a
future case when the parties do not follow the standard form but do not specifically reject it,
the better view of the parties' agreement is a definition of senior claim that includes
postbankruptcy interest.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
43. See id.
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dividends to the junior creditor. This subrogation cuts out free-
riding nonsenior creditors and is, therefore, consistent with effi-
ciency considerations and with the purpose of the contracting
parties.
The theory propounded in alternative (c) can be used to jus-
tify the implication of subrogation into every surety relationship."
If subrogation were not implied, the surety not only would benefit
the assured creditor, but also would enrich the debtor's estate and
hence the general creditors. The removal of any creditor from a
pro rata distribution increases the share of the remaining creditors.
Subrogation allows the surety to take the place of the assured
creditor and recover the dividend otherwise payable to the assured
party. Subrogation does not prejudice the general creditors in com-
parison to their presurety position and reduces the cost of the ar-
rangement to the surety. All of these reasons exist in the context of
surety as well as subordination. 5
C. Assignments and Subrogation in Analogous Subordination
Systems
Both the assignment and subrogation portions of the double
dividend system should become a part of the federal doctrine of
equitable subordination. Section 510(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
states that a court may "subordinate for purposes of distribution
all or part of an allowed claim to ...all or part of an allowed
interest to all or part of another allowed interest. . . .-6 Signifi-
cantly, Congress has drawn a distinction between equitable subor-
dination to all claims and subordination to a subset of claims. This
distinction has meaning only if double dividends are awarded to
the subset. Otherwise, the court only can institute a general demo-
tion of a claim to a position below that of general creditors, 7 which
44. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 57(i), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (creditor that has re-
ceived its full claim partly from dividends and partly from surety must hold additional divi-
dends in trust for surety).
45. The Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 177kkk (1982), sets up a double dividend
system whenever the indenture trustee, as independent creditor, accepts a preference four
months before bankruptcy. See infra note 71. The indenture trustee is subrogated to that
part of the senior creditors' (i.e., debenture holders') claim that is satisfied from the pro-
ceeds of the indenture trustee's preference. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 439
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1971). Thus, subrogation rights fit naturally into subordination regimes.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (1982).
47. See In re Pat Freeman, Inc., 42 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (using demo-
tion theory, even though the guilty creditor had harmed only one person); In re Osborne, 42
Bankr. 988 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (remanding case to determine proper standard for equi-
table subordination to a single harmed creditor).
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would not give special benefit to the subset of claims.48
Congress also invites a double dividend system in section
509(c), which subrogates a guarantor to the rights of the benefited
creditor to the extent that the guarantor has paid the creditor.49
An obvious problem arises when the guarantor pays only half the
guaranteed claim. If it enters the bankruptcy proceeding along
with the half-paid creditor, both parties are entitled to bankruptcy
dividends. The presence of the guarantor is prejudicial to the guar-
anteed creditor but not to the nonguaranteed creditors. 50 Congress
has solved this dilemma by providing:
The court shall subordinate to the claim of a creditor and for the benefit of
such creditor an allowed claim, by way of subrogation under section 509 of
this title, or for reimbursement or contribution, of an entity that is liable
with the debtor on, or that has secured, such creditor's claim, until such cred-
itor's claim is paid in full, either through payments under this title or
otherwise.51
A full double dividend system best effects this statutory language.
Such a system removes the prejudice to the guaranteed creditor
caused by a partially performing guarantor making subrogation
claims in bankruptcy and prevents a windfall to general creditors.
The double dividend system pays the guaranteed creditor at the
same rate as if it had made its full claim in bankruptcy and as if
there had been no partial satisfaction of the guarantor.52
48. The suggested approach for both contractual and equitable subordination is pun-
ishment to fit the crime. See In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 604 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983). Subordination to a specific creditor should not adhere to the
benefit of all creditors. Professor Clark has urged sculpting equitable subordination to
match fault in a different context. Professor Clark believes that an important goal of equita-
ble subordination is punishment of insider creditors for taking fraudulent conveyances. He
believes that recovery of the fraudulent conveyance is the fairest remedy, but if a court uses
equitable subordination, the amount of the fraudulent conveyance should be offset against
the bankruptcy dividend otherwise due to the subordinated creditor. This rule would suc-
ceed in avoiding the overcompensation or undercompensation of the general creditors. See
Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505, 518-25
(1977).
Analogously, the rules proposed for § 510(c) and for contractual subordination try to
achieve the distributional fairness that concerns Professor Clark.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 509(c) (1982).
50. Nonguaranteed creditors must expect that a full dividend is allocable to the guar-
anteed debt. Whether the dividend goes to the guarantor or to the benefited creditor, how-
ever, is a matter of indifference to the general creditors.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 509(c) (1982).
52. A numerical example might help illustrate the beneficial effects of double divi-
dends as applied to suretyship. Suppose A guarantees B's loan of $100 to D. D defaults and
files in bankruptcy. B demands payment from A, but A pays only $50. B then seeks the
deficit in D's bankruptcy proceeding. Meanwhile A also seeks to recover $50 from D on the
grounds that A is subrogated to B's claim for that $50. Assume that D's trustee can pay
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D. The Meaning Accorded to the Word "Subordinated"
The preceding analysis gives meaning to the subordination
agreement that contains no express promise to forego payment or
to assign bankruptcy dividends. In In re Joe Newcomer Finance
Co." the court ruled that the term "subordinated" had no inherent
meaning. Two leading authors also have demurred on what mean-
ing to give the simple statement that a debt is "subordinated.""
More should be done with the term than these authors or the New-
comer court were willing to do.
The analysis of a subordination clause unaccompanied by any
explicit promise is best divided into two parts. First, does a credi-
tor intend to change its position when it uses the term "subordi-
nated"? Second, in what respect does a creditor intend to change
its position?
As to the first point, a typical creditor should understand that
subordination pertains to bankruptcy priority, and that subordi-
nated debt falls behind other debt in that priority.5 5 The diction-
50% of all claims.
If A is allowed to make a subrogation claim for $50, the estate is depleted by $25, to B's
detriment. Section 509(c) therefore requires that A be demoted. The issue addressed in the
text is the disposition of the $25 that A would have received from D's trustee, but for the
operation of § 509(c).
If the $25 is distributed to all the creditors, B takes only a pro rata share of it. On the
other hand, if the $25 is given entirely to B, the other creditors are not harmed because B is
receiving $50 on a claim that was initially $100.
53. 226 F. Supp. 387, 392 (D. Colo. 1964). The ambiguous clause read: "The interest
on these notes shall be payable only out of earnings of the corporation and the principal
represented hereby, and interest thereon, shall be subordinated to the claims of all other
general creditors, secured or unsecured, including banks [sic]." Id. at 389. A semicolon be-
tween "corporation" and "and" would have rendered clear the intent to subordinate. The
court noted that the clause reads as if the debtor promised to pay interest out of the princi-
pal of the debenture, an absurd notion, except that the debtor, in Ponzi-llke fashion, appar-
ently did just that.
Placement of semicolons seems to be a major issue in subordination cases. See In re
W.T. Grant Co., 4 Bankr. 53, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 20 Bankr. 186 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982), afl'd, 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983).
54. "A subordination clause may provide merely that [the] debt is 'hereby subordi-
nated.'... [T]here have.., been no decisions on whether a clause so inartistically drawn
is to be construed as effecting a complete subordination ... or an inchoate subordination
.... " 2 G. GILMOR, supra note 7, § 37.1, at 986. "It is clear that there is no real authority
supporting either side of the argument-the law has not progressed to that point. The argu-
ment serves only to emphasize the need for well-drawn subordination agreements." Calligar,
supra note 5, at 383.
55. Aldrich v. Redington, 605 F.2d 590, 597 (2d Cir. 1978); In re Eaton Factors Co., 3
Bankr. 20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). In these cases, junior creditors unsuccessfully asserted
that they did not understand the meaning of the word "subordinated" because they were
unsophisticated.
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ary definition of subordination compels this conclusion. A creditor
should not be able to deny that a "subordinated" claim is less val-
uable than an ordinary claim.5 Second, the vague promise to be
subordinated, without more, implies assent to the double dividends
system. The alternatives are unacceptable. A general demotion
specific senior creditors are the beneficiaries grants an expensive
free ride to unnamed general creditors.57 Of course, if the vague
promise does not specify senior creditors, or if it is for the benefit
of all creditors, the effect of double dividends is indistinguishable
from a general demotion.58 Thus, in the Newcomer case, the vague
promise to be "subordinated to all other general creditors,
' ' 9
would not produce double dividends for any specific senior credi-
tor. The promise should have resulted in the general demotion of
the unfortunate holders of the "subordinated debenture notes." 60
Complete subordination also should be rejected as the basic
meaning of the word "subordinated." Complete subordination is
inconsistent with provisions in loan agreements that stipulate a
specific maturity. Under a complete subordination, the junior cred-
itor promises that it will not exercise its right to collect on its debt
56. Newcomer, 226 F. Supp. at 391. The court in Newcomer said that the subordi-
nated debenture holders "were not sophisticated in the sense that they would be likely to
give accurate legal scrutiny to the rather ambivalent wording of their documents." Id. at
391. A difference exists, however, between inability to describe all the legal ramifications of
subordination-an inability upon which publication of this Article is premised-and an in-
ability to understand that subordinated debt is not as good as ordinary debt.
57. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
58. In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768, 770 (2d Cir. 1938).
59. See supra note 53.
60. If the objective is to eliminate free riders, a division of junior dividends other than
that envisioned in the double dividends system also might suffice. For example, instead of
giving all junior dividends to the senior creditor, subordination might allow the transfer of
just enough dividends to "hold the senior creditor harmless" in preserving the senior credi-
tor's prior position. Suppose there are nine claims on the debtor. The junior debt is the
tenth claim. The junior creditor could give enough dividends to ensure the senior creditor a
one-ninth share of the estate. The junior creditor then would retain the rest, even though
the senior creditor was not paid fully. Although this system eliminates free riders (as would
any other division of junior dividends between junior and senior creditors), it does not com-
port with the meaning of the word "subordination" as used in commercial law. Subordina-
tion is tied integrally with the termination of the transferor's rights in his former property.
Carlson, Death and Subordination Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Sen-
ior Buyers and Senior Lien Creditors, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 547, 558-62 (1984). Subordination
implies a hierarchy of secured creditors that give way completely to the senior party before
the junior can receive any payment. Thus, subordination is less suited to the above "hold
harmless" interpretation, under which the junior creditor may retain a large percentage of
his dividends. Of course, this alternative construction is even less supportable when the
parties set forth the core subordination promise-that the junior creditor will receive no
payment until the senior creditor is paid. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
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when the debt matures, even if the common debtor is solvent and
completely able to pay the senior debt. On the other hand, subor-
dination contingent on liquidation allows the junior creditor to re-
ceive periodic payments at maturity providing the debtor is not
bankrupt.61
E. Payments Wrongfully Received by the Junior Creditor in
Breach of the Subordination Promise
The principle of excluding nonsenior creditors from the bene-
fits of subordination has led to a full double dividend system, in-
cluding subrogation of the junior creditor to the senior creditor's
future dividends after the senior creditor is paid fully. The same
principle permits a similar interpretation of the "trust clause" that
appears in standard form subordination agreements. In addition,
this principle suggests that a trust clause should be implied into
every subordination relation, unless a contrary intent clearly exists.
In support of the junior creditor's promise not to receive pay-
ment from the common debtor, the trust clause provides that any
payments actually received by the junior creditor, in violation of
the subordination agreement, should be held in trust for the senior
creditors.6 " The trust clause presents an issue that is sure to arise
in bankruptcy court: what are the trustee's rights when the junior
creditor has received a wrongful payment immediately before
bankruptcy?
As a preliminary matter, if the payment is voidable by the
trustee as a preference, the trustee should recover it for the benefit
of all the creditors. Afterwards, the senior creditors should receive
their double dividends based on the junior creditor's share of the
enhanced estate.6 3 The senior creditors alone, however, should reap
subordination benefits to the exclusion of nonsenior creditors when
payment received by the junior creditor is not a voidable prefer-
ence. If the trustee is allowed to recover the trust property, general
creditors that were not parties to the subordination agreement
61. Cf. Allegaert v. Chemical Bank, 454 F. Supp. 341, 347 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 657 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1980). While the decision is not clear, apparently
the court interpreted an ambiguous subordination clause to be a "complete" subordination,
despite a schedule of payments that was rendered ineffectual by such a construction.
62. See In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1966); Model Simplified
Indenture, supra note 15, at 770 (§ 11.06).
63. Cf. Clark, supra note 48, at 518. Professor Clark generally prefers avoidance of
transfers to any attempt to set off or adjust bankruptcy dividends to account for the illegal
transfer.
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would benefit. The senior creditors, therefore, should be the sole
beneficiaries of trust property, provided the payment to the junior
creditor was not otherwise generally fraudulent or preferential.
A trustee may use section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 4 to
argue that an express or implied trust clause subrogates it to the
senior creditors' rights. The trustee then would claim the amount
recoverable by the senior creditors for the benefit of the estate.6 5
Furthermore, under the rule of Moore v. Bay,6 the trustee would
be able to recover the entire improper payment even if the amount
of the senior claim is less than the amount of the payment. Use of
section 544(b) provides an unjustifiable windfall to general credi-
tors, while depriving senior creditors of the benefit of their "paid-
for" status. Nevertheless, the historical evidence undeniably shows
that section 70(e) of the 1898 Act, predecessor to section 544(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code, was used to achieve this result. Prior to
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), chattel mort-
gage statutes frequently provided that unrecorded interests were
voidable by creditors that extended their credit during the un-
perfected life of the security interest. Those creditors that ex-
tended credit after the filing had no such rights. Under chattel
mortgage statutes, the security interest was voidable by some, but
not all creditors.67 If an actual creditor with avoidance rights ex-
isted, then the trustee could use section 70(e) to recover all the
property for the benefit of all creditors. 8 Hence, section 70(e) pro-
64. Section 544(b) provides: "The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applica-
ble law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982).
65. See Blanck v. Young, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,756, at 94,963 (D. Utah 1979).
66. 284 U.S. 4 (1931). Under the rule of Moore v. Bay, if trustee can subrogate herself
to a claim of one dollar against which a large transfer is voidable, the entire transfer is
recoverable for the estate, not just the dollar's worth. See In re Plonta, 311 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.
1962). Congress specifically endorsed Moore v. Bay in § 544(b), Report of Committee on the
Judiciary, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 61 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5847 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 989], after Professor Coun-
tryman argued that, absent Moore v. Bay, the trustee would have to waste valuable re-
sources locating unsecured creditors with enough claims to avoid an entire transfer. With
Moore v. Bay, the trustee need only locate one such creditor. See The Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 1975 (Part II): Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 521-55 (1975).
67. See G. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 16.3, at 486-87.
68. See Buchman v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 250 F. Supp. 60 (1965). Moore v.
Bay, discussed supra note 66, thus makes two controversial points. First, the trustee may
recover all the transferred property, even if it is worth more than the claims of the creditors
to whom the trustee is subrogated. Second, the proceeds of the recovery should go to all the
creditors, not just to those to whom the trustee was subrogated. For the view that Justice
Holmes in Moore v. Bay intended only to establish the second rule, see Jackson, Avoiding
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vided a windfall to postperfection creditors that were beyond the
scope of the recording statute's protection.
A distinction exists between contractual subordination and the
chattel mortgage decisions just described. A creditor with the right
to set aside an unrecorded chattel mortgage only had the standard
fraudulent conveyance remedy. That is, the creditor could obtain a
judicial lien that was enforceable against the debtor's property and
any property that the debtor has conveyed away in a voidable
chattel mortgage. Roughly speaking, the creditor could only force
the holder of the chattel mortgage to return the collateral to the
debtor so that it could be susceptible to judicial liens. The creditor
had no property interest in the fraudulently conveyed property un-
til the judicial lien attached to it. In the trust clause circumstance,
the senior creditor does not seek the return of the trust property to
the debtor, but rather claims a property interest in the payment
and seeks to obtain it directly from the junior creditor. This trans-
action is not "voidable" within the meaning of section 544(b). Fol-
lowing this reasoning, a trustee may not subrogate itself to a senior
creditor's right to recover improper payments made to the junior
creditor. Indeed, to the extent of the improper payment, the senior
creditor is secured. Under section 544(b), a trustee can subrogate
itself only to the rights of an unsecured creditor.
When a subordination agreement is silent, trust clauses should
be implied. When no trust clause has been set forth expressly, the
bankruptcy court must decide the appropriate remedies for pay-
ments received in violation of a subordination agreement. The
choice is to give the proceeds to all creditors or to the named sen-
ior creditors only. When a class of senior creditors has been singled
out, it alone should receive subordination benefits.6 9 Other credi-
tors are free riders with no persuasive claim to relieL70 Therefore,
Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 742-50 (1984).
69. Supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
70. For those states not exempting subordination agreements from Article 9 of the
UCC, a second strong justification exists for finding that junior creditors should hold all
illegal payments for the senior creditors and therefore should not return them to the debtor.
As will become clear later, see infra text accompanying notes 121-41, subordination agree-
ments amount to Article 9 security interests in the junior debt granted by the junior credi-
tor to the senior creditor. Because the junior debt is collateral, any amounts collected by the
junior creditor are proceeds of the collateral. Under § 9-306, the senior creditor has an auto-
matic security interest in proceeds.
This security interest does not prove, however, that the junior creditor has an immedi-
ate duty to hand over proceeds. Generally, the secured party has no right to possess the
collateral until default occurs. The parties, however, are free to decide among themselves
which of them has the present right to possess collateral. U.C.C. § 9-501(2) (1977). A junior
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improper payments should be recoverable for the benefit of senior
creditors only.71
IV. SUBORDINATION AS AN OWNERSHIP TRANSFER OF THE JUNIOR
DEBT
A. Subordination of Debt
The fundamental subordination promise-the promise by a
junior creditor to receive no payment on its claim until the senior
creditors are paid-is an assignment of the junior claim for secur-
ity by a nonrecourse guarantor. The consequence of this statement
is not merely a matter of terminology. Application of the term "as-
signment" implies a bridging of the gap between a junior creditor's
personal obligation enforceable by money judgment and a property
claim on the junior creditor's asset-the junior claim against the
creditor that has promised not to receive prebankruptcy payments specifically has agreed
not to possess collateral. Because the senior creditor is superior to the common debtor as
possessor of the proceeds, it is an easy step to the conclusion that the senior creditor should
have the immediate right to proceeds held by the junior creditor. Once the senior creditor
obtains the illegal payments it may use the money to reduce the senior claim. Id. § 9-
207(2)(c).
71. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 presents an interesting context in which to test
the interpretation of the trust clause. The Trust Indenture Act permits the indenture trus-
tee to be a creditor of the issuer in competition with its indenture beneficiaries. But when
the trustee, as a senior creditor, receives payment on or reduction of its claim from the
issuer in the four month period before bankruptcy, it must set apart and hold the value it
has received for the benefit of the debenture holders, regardless of whether they are subor-
dinated to its claim. 15 U.S.C. § 77kkk(a) (1982); see also id. § 77kkk(b)(1) (indenture may
exempt short term debt from this rule). The indenture trustee is also a pro rata beneficiary
of this fund. Id. § 77kkk(a).
These rules create a "trust fund" to which the debenture holders are senior creditors.
The fund guarantees that the debenture holders will receive double dividends. Because the
indenture trustee is often a senior creditor under the subordination clause of the debenture,
Morris v. Cantor, 390 F. Supp. 817, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), it is necessary to determine
whether the trustee can recapture by contract part of what debenture holders have received
from the indenture trustee by statute. See United States Trust Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank,
57 A.D. 2d 285, 394 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656 (1977) (issue raised but not resolved), aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d
869, 382 N.E.2d 1355, 410 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1978).
Applying the analysis from the text, the special fund for the debenture holders should
exist only when the preference received by the indenture trustee is not generally voidable.
Only preferences received between three months (the bankruptcy preference period) and
four months (the Trust Indenture Act period) of bankruptcy go into the special fund, al-
though other eligible payments are conceivable. This amount should benefit only the deben-
ture holders. Other creditors should not benefit. Receipt of these extra dividends by the
subordinated debenture holders, however, is an improper payment and, hence, trust prop-
erty for senior creditors under the debenture. See Model Simplified Indenture, supra note
15, at 770 (§ 11.06). Therefore, the senior creditors under the debenture must receive these
contributions from the fund. If the indenture trustee is within this class, it can recapture
part of the fund that it earlier had donated to the junior creditor debenture holders.
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debtor. If the junior creditor has transferred its claim against the
debtor, the junior claim is no longer part of the junior creditor's
estate, and the senior creditor's legal rights are protected from the
junior creditor's bankruptcy. This is important because inside
creditors frequently subordinate their claims to induce new credit,
simultaneous bankruptcy of the debtor and junior creditor is not
therefore uncommon.
A second benefit of establishing subordination as an assign-
ment of the junior claim is that assignments of choses in action are
understood far better than subordination of general debt. Recogni-
tion that subordinations are assignments would allow courts to
borrow the rules of assignments to decide subordination cases. 2
An assignment is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts as the "manifestation of the assignor's intention to transfer
[rights against the obligor] by virtue of which the assignor's right
to performance by the obligor is extinguished in whole or in part
and the assignee acquires a right to such performance. ' 73 An as-
signment is, therefore, in the nature of a transfer of "title '74 to a
chose in action. Once an assignment is made known to the debtor,
it has an obligation to pay the assignee. Payment to the assignor
after notification no longer discharges the debt.7 5 When the cir-
cumstances of the assignment are in dispute, the debtor, at its risk,
must determine which party is the true owner of the contractual
rights against it.76
The infusion of a contingency into an assignment is a sure
formula for judicial consternation. "[T]o some courts," commented
Professor Gilmore, "words of condition and futurity are like red
72. Synonymity of subordination and assignment has an unpleasant side ef-
fect-assignments of choses in action to secure debt are security interests under Article 9 of
the UCC. While some have defended UCC coverage as beneficial-senior creditors would
have to alert the junior creditor's creditors that an asset is encumbered-other features of
Article 9 coverage are disastrous. Discussion of the impact of the UCC will be deferred
pending a more general examination of assignments of choses in action and subordination of
debt. See infra text accompanying notes 121-53.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(1) (1979).
74. The common law imposed great formalities on the transfer of the land but never
required nearly as much formality for assignment of contractual rights. It is sufficient if the
assignor manifests its intention to assign "without further action or manifestation of inten-
tion by the [assignor]." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 324 (1979). Unless forbid-
den by the Statute of Frauds, an assignment may be oral. Id. The assignor need not mani-
fest its intent to assign to the assignee but may manifest it to a third person. Id. In most
subordinated debentures, an assignor manifests its intent to assign bankruptcy dividends to
the common debtor, not the assignee-senior creditor.
75. Id. § 338(1).
76. Id. §§ 322, 329.
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rags to a bull."' 77 Yet it is exactly these red rags that are of most
concern because the common debtor's bankruptcy is both a contin-
gency and a futurity regarding the junior creditor's assignment of
bankruptcy dividends. 78
In order to render the equation of assignments and subordina-
tion persuasive, three tricky aspects of assignments, contingency,
and futurity must be understood. The following comments will
show that subordination is a present assignment of a chose in ac-
tion, with the right to collect deferred to the debtor's bankruptcy.
1. Assignments Versus Promises to Assign in the Future
A present assignment divests the assignor of title and places
title in the assignee. A promise to assign does not transfer title. It
presupposes some future "livery of seisin" by the assignor before
title is transferred .7  The consequences are important. The breach
of a mere promise to assign gives the promisee only a breach of
contract action against the assignor. The wronged promisee gener-
ally cannot recover the property in dispute.80 In contrast, a present
assignment followed by a second assignment gives rise to a classic
priority dispute between assignees. If the assignment is a security
interest, Article 9 will provide the rules for deciding who wins. If
the assignment is not for security or is exempted from Article 9,81
the common law of assignments establishes the priorities.2
Subordination is not a mere promise to assign in the future.
77. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 7.5, at 209.
78. Henson, The Problem of Uniformity, 20 Bus. LAW. 689, 693 (1965) ("We really are
dealing with the contingent assignment of a potential future claim which in the normal
course of events will never become enforceable.").
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 330 (1979).
80. Under some circumstances, promises to assign might give rise to a right to specific
performance by the potential assignee, in which case the assignee has "equitable property"
good against all third parties except bona fide purchasers for value. See infra note 84.
81. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-104(d) (1977) (assignment of wages excluded); id. § 9-104(f) (as-
signment of a single account in satisfaction of antecedent debt excluded). Article 9 covers an
assignment of a single account in exchange for present value but deems it automatically
perfected under § 9-302(1)(e). As an automatically perfected security interest, the common-
law priority rules pertaining to assignments, infra note 82, would not apply.
82. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1979). The three variants are the
New York rule (first in time is first in right), the English rule (first to notify the obligor),
and the Four Horseman rule. The Restatement adopts this last rule and follows "first in
time is first in right" with four exceptions: the subsequent assignee wins if, in good faith and
without knowledge of the prior assignment, (a) it has been paid first, (b) it obtains a judg-
ment first, (c) it and the obligor enter into a novation first, or (d) it has obtained commer-
cial paper, and the first assignee has not. These rules are discussed in 2 G. GILMORE, supra
note 7, § 25.6 at 670.
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Subordination agreements frequently specify that the senior credi-
tor is to receive bankruptcy dividends if and when bankruptcy oc-
curs. The senior creditor will become the owner of bankruptcy div-
idends without any further act by the junior creditor. This is just
as true when the parties manifest nothing explicitly about bank-
ruptcy dividends. Courts universally have recognized that the non-
contingent promise not to receive payment until the senior claims
are paid eventually evolves into the double dividend system."3 The
junior creditor need only assent to the subordination for the senior
creditor to receive dividend rights.8 4
83. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
84. But see SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 448 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1971). In Plohn the
junior creditor had promised to sign a standard form subordination agreement of the New
York Stock Exchange. The facts do not indicate that the parties signed the agreement. The
opinion deals with whether the common debtor's receiver should sell collateral in which the
junior creditor had an interest. The assumption of the case is that the promise to
subordinate was the equivalent of actual subordination and that the proceeds of the collat-
eral would adhere to the benefit the senior creditors.
Promises to assign frequently were termed "equitable assignments." See 1 G. GiLMoRE,
supra note 7, § 7.2, at 198. Their status in bankruptcy has a long and painful history. See
Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interest as Voidable Preferences, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 378-
84 (1982). The nature of an equitable assignment was far from clear, but, if a person had an
equitable assignment, he had a property interest that frequently was good against the as-
signor's creditors. Only bona fide purchasers of the assigned intangible took free of the equi-
table interest of the assignee. The 1898 Bankruptcy Act included a major attempt to curb
the equitable assignment. Section 60(a)(6) stated that if (1) a transfer was for security and
(2) applicable law required a writing, delivery of possession, or recording as a condition to
its full validity against third persons other than buyers in the ordinary course of trade, and
(3) such transfer resulted only in an equitable lien, such transfer was not deemed made,
notwithstanding its state law priority over a subsequent lien creditor. Id. at 378. Under the
1898 Act the equitable subordination in Plohn probably would have been a voidable prefer-
ence, that is, a transfer on antecedent debt, in the junior creditor's bankruptcy. Under the
present Bankruptcy Code, however, the preference statute makes no special attempt to de-
stroy equitable assignments. See id. at 384.
Whether state law should recognize an equitable assignment must relate in some degree
to whether an adequate legal remedy exists. Failure to execute an assignment is compensa-
ble by damages, which, under traditional doctrine, precludes the equitable remedy of spe-
cific performance. The rules may differ when the junior creditor assignor is insolvent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (1979) (supporting specific performance in
these cases).
Applying these assignment rules to subordinations is treacherous. When the junior
creditor is insolvent, it is defensible to find an equitable interest in the junior claim. But the
rationale disappears when the junior creditor is solvent. If the junior creditor does not honor
his promise to subordinate, the senior creditors incur huge transaction costs and must bring
a state contract action against the junior creditor. This cost is unacceptable in the context of
Plohn, which concerned protection of stockbroker customers by a regulatory agency. On the
other hand, any attempt to broaden proprietary interests created by contractual promises
may have pernicious effects on commercial law. See generally Oesterle, Deficiencies of the
Restitutionary Right to Trace Misappropriated Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306,
68 CORNELL L. REV. 172 (1983).
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Notwithstanding the above, three courts have found that the
core subordination promise alone does not constitute an assign-
ment.85 Calligar, in an extreme position, states that a subordina-
tion promise does not protect the senior creditors from the junior
creditor's bankruptcy because the junior creditor still owns the
junior claim. Calligar, however, believes the totemistic words "I as-
sign bankruptcy dividends" protect the senior creditors com-
pletely.86 These views defeat a major purpose of subordina-
tion-security for the senior debt. Requiring the magic words of
express assignment is a trap for the unwary. Everyone agrees that
the promise not to receive payment before the senior creditors are
paid results in double dividends-the heart of the assignment
idea. 7 Consequently, the "no payment" promise hould be seen to
transfer ownership of the junior claim.
2. The Assignment of Property Presently Owned Versus
Property Not Yet Owned (After-Acquired Property)
A basic tenet of commercial law is that a person may not as-
sign a right that he does not own. In primitive times, an attempt to
assign nonexistent property was a mere promise to assign. After
the property came into existence, the parties had to remanifest
their intent to assign.8 Modern thinking, as embodied in Article 9,
is more enlightened. 9 It is still impossible to transfer property not
My recommendation is to make a sui generis rule for subordination that would equate
the promise to subordinate with the actual subordination. This rule would avoid wasting the
resources of the senior creditors. Cf. Aldrich v. Redington, 605 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1978) (sen-
ior creditors absolved from proving reliance to estop junior creditors from rescinding subor-
dination). Courts should be given stern warning against expanding the "equitable assign-
ment" doctrine beyond the subordination context.
85. First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); Cherno v. Dutch Mercantile Corp., 353 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1965);
In re Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co., 148 F. Supp. 647 (D.N.H. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 244
F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1957).
86. Calligar, supra note 5, at 395. A similar issue arises in more standard security
interest cases. In American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963), the
court held that a security agreement that does not include words of grant fails to create a
security interest. The American Card view has been criticized as needlessly interfering with
the intent of the parties to create a security interest. See In re Bollinger Corp., 614 F.2d 924
(3d Cir. 1980); see also Nickles, Rethinking Some U.C.C. Article 9 Problems-Subrogation;
Equitable Liens; Actual Knowledge; Waiver of Security Interests; Secured Party Liability
for Conversion Under Part 5, 34 ARK. L. Rav. 1, 50-71 (1980) (defending the requirement of
words of grant, if coupled with the existence of equitable liens outside the UCC).
87. See supra note 27.
88. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 2.4, at 33. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
still adheres to this rule. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRAcTs § 327(2) (1979).
89. See U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 1 (1977).
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yet acquired.90 But when the debtor acquires the property, Article
9 deems the assignment effective immediately, which automatically
gives the assignee rights in the property.
Subordination of debt is not an assignment of after-acquired
property, but is the assignment of the existing junior debt itself.
The right to receive bankruptcy dividends is not different from the
simple right of the junior creditor to be repaid in general. Subordi-
nation of existing debt is, therefore, not an effective attempt to
convey a property right that the assignor does not yet have."'
3. Assignments with Present Rights to Collect Versus
Assignments with Contingent Rights to Collect
A third tricky distinction is between an assignment that gives
an immediate right to receive an income stream from the obligor
and an assignment that gives the right to receive payments only
after a contingency has occurred. Both transactions are present as-
signments.2 When the collateral is an income stream owed by a
third party, courts become confused by this distinction." An exam-
90. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(e)(3), 552(a) (1982); U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c) (1977).
91. One commentator suggests that assignments of bankruptcy dividends are not as-
signments of the debt itself. See Zinman, Under the Spreading U.C.C.-Subordinations
and Article 9, 7 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1965). Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, supra
note 14, at 244, sort this out correctly early in their article, but later fall into error by
equating the right to bankruptcy dividends with a claim on after-acquired property. Id. at
253.
92. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 331 comment b (1979); see Segal v.
Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379-81 (1966) ("Postponed enjoyment does not disqualify an interest
as 'property.' ").
93. An excellent example of a district court judge falling afoul of this distinction is
Allegaert v. Chemical Bank, 454 F. Supp. 341 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 657 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.
1980). In Allegaert the collateral was a debenture. The pledge agreement covering the col-
lateral permitted the debtor to receive payments until default on the debtor's loan obliga-
tions. 454 F. Supp. at 344-45. The security interest in the debenture was perfected in July
1973, 657 F.2d at 500, default occurred some time in January 1974, id. at 501, and the
obligor on the pledged debenture paid the debenture to the secured party on March 26,
1974. The next day, the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Id. The trustee sued the secured party
to recover the March 26 payment on the theory that it was a voidable preference.
The secured party argued that the payments were not voidable preferences because
they emanated from the pledged debenture, which had been transferred well before the
preference period. The district court judge, however, reasoned that the parties to the pledge
agreements must have agreed that no security interest existed until default because the
debtor could receive debenture payments until then. Thus, the district court judge deter-
mined that the debenture was not transferred until. 454 F. Supp. at 349-50.
The Second Circuit did not make the same analytical error. It ruled the pledge per-
fected in July 1973. Thus, the creation of the security interest was not a voidable preference.
657 F.2d at 511.
Allegaert was more complicated because the secured party had subordinated itself to a
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ple in which a television set is substituted for the income stream
should clarify the principle. When the television set is Article 9
collateral, the debtor usually is entitled to possess the television
until default. After default, the secured party is entitled to repos-
sess. Clearly the secured party has a property interest in the televi-
sion set before the debtor defaults. The secured party's right to the
income stream in the above example is similar to the right to the
television set. In both cases the secured party has a property inter-
est in the collateral before default.
A subordination agreement is an assignment in which the sen-
ior creditor has no right to receive payment on the junior debt un-
til the contingency of the common debtor's liquidation occurs. At
that point, the right to future payments reverts to the senior credi-
tor. In this regard, subordination is analogous to nonnotification
accounts receivable financing,94 which allows the debtor to collect
and retain proceeds of encumbered accounts provided it has not
defaulted.9 5
4. Equitable Assignments and Equitable Liens
Some courts have been willing to categorize subordination
agreements as "equitable" assignments. 6 "Equitable assignment"
and "equitable lien,"'97 according to Professor Gilmore, are terms
that have "long plagued this field of law, obfuscated discussion and
class of senior creditors. No doubt the district court judge was suspicious that a junior credi-
tor also could be a secured creditor. His decision may have been a misguided effort to do
rough justice. As to whether creditors can be junior under a subordination agreement and
secured under a pledge agreement, see infra text accompanying notes 198-209.
94. For a description of nonnotification accounts receivable financing, see 1 G. GIL-
MORE, supra note 7, § 8.1.
95. In First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d 450, 455 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976), the Second Circuit confused the time when the senior
creditor is entitled to receive payment on the junior debt-after bankruptcy-with the time
the assignment is made. The court compounded the error in a highly original way when it
assumed not that the assignment was deferred, but that any arrangement that involves futu-
rity or contingency must not be an assignment at all. Nevertheless, in American Foam Rub-
ber, the Second Circuit conceded that the senior creditor could receive bankruptcy divi-
dends, even when not "assigned" to it.
96. In re Alda Commercial Corp., 300 F. Supp. 294, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); In re
Itemlab, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 194, 197-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); In re Handy-Andy Community
'Stores, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 97, 98-99 (W.D. La. 1932).
97. Various courts have referred to subordination assignments as equitable liens.
Searle v. Mechanics' Loan & Trust Co., 249 F.2d 942, 945 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S.
592 (1918); In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 16 F.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). I understand
"equitable lien" to be synonymous with "equitable assignment" for security. Calligar, supra
note 5, at 384-85, assumes they are separate theories of subordination.
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made clear analysis almost an impossibility."' 8 Gilmore identified
five meanings to the adjective equitable:
"Equitable" is used in at least the following senses. (1) A right which was at
one time... enforced only in courts of equity and not in courts of law. (2) A
right in some kind of property which is thought or felt to be "essentially"
equitable in nature (such as trust property), without regard to whether the
right has been enforced in courts of law or equity or both. (3) A security
interest which is ineffective as to creditors of the borrower or purchasers of
the collateral without notice because [the security agreement was defective or
unperfected]. (4) [After-acquired property.] (5) An interest which, because of
some rule of substantive law, cannot be made effective against some other
type ... of interest in the property.9
Most of these definitions cannot apply to subordination. Gilmore's
definition (3) cannot apply because perfection is relevant only in
the junior creditor's bankruptcy, not the debtor's. The debtor's
creditors have no right to the bankruptcy dividends that the junior
creditor receives under federal law. Definition (4) is inapplicable
because subordination of present debt does not involve any after-
acquired property concepts. 100 Definition (5) is similarly un-
helpful.' 01 The first two definitions might fit because subordina-
tions are enforceable in bankruptcy, which is a province of equity.
But bankruptcy courts also recognize and enforce "legal" assign-
ments. The adjective "equitable" adds nothing.
Some commentators have suggested that the consequence of
the adjective "equitable" is the imposition of different priority
rules. If subordination is an equitable assignment, good faith pur-
chasers of the junior debt might take free of the subordination be-
cause they take free of equitable interests generally. 0 2 In compari-
98. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 198.
99. Id. § 7, at 198-99 (footnotes omitted).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
101. In definition (5) Professor Gilmore simply meant that in a priority contest the
party with the "equitable" assignment would lose on the facts. Gilmore thought this defini-
tion was applicable "nine times out of ten." 1 G. GILMoRE, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 199.
102. See Calligar, supra note 5, at 395-96; Heileson & Hirsch, Private Subordination
Agreements and the U.C.C.: Is Section 1-209 an Un-Wyse Solution, 38 Bus. LAW. 555, 564-
65 (1983); Zinman, supra note 91, at 24 n.72.
Some commentators have thought that subordination creates a constructive trust in
which the junior creditor is the trustee, the senior creditor is the beneficiary, and the junior
claim is the res of the trust. See Calligar, supra note 5, at 386-88. The Restatement favors
protection of bona fide purchasers of a debt that is the res of a trust, and under this rule no
distinction exists between calling subordination an equitable assignment or constructive
trust. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 343 (1979). But the Restatement rule
seems to have been an innovation. Early cases refused to apply the bona fide purchaser rule
to constructive trusts when the res was a general intangible. See Glenn, The Assignment of
Chases in Action; Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser, 20 VA. L. REv. 621, 627-28 (1934). If these
older cases are followed, the label "constructive trust" produces priorities identical to those
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son, legal assignments are subject to ordinary principles of "first in
time is first in right," the New York version, or "first to notify the
obligor," the English rule.10 3
Since there is no logical distinction between subordination and
the assignment of junior debt,104 changing the priority rules for
subordinations because they are "equitable" would serve little pur-
pose. The principle of good faith purchaser protection, has merit,
but there is no rational reason to limit the benefits of that policy to
subordinations when that doctrine could apply with equal benefit
to all assignments of debt.
5. Benefits of the Equation
Equation of subordination with assignment solves problems
that have perplexed courts. First, this equation explains why bank-
ruptcy courts concern themselves in what essentially is a collateral
contract between creditors.10 5 Calligar proposed four theories to
explain bankruptcy court jurisdiction over such contracts,' but
the equation of assignment and subordination provides an easier
answer. Subordination is an assignment. The trustee must honor
subordination agreements because it stands in the shoes of the
debtor which must always determine, at its risk, the true owner of
a claim. 0 7 This simpler answer'08 has an important implication.
applicable to "legal" assignments-first in time is first in right-assuming the obligor al-
ready is notified.
103. See supra note 82.
104. See supra notes 72-103 and accompanying text.
105. Only one court has refused to determine the rightful recipient of junior dividends.
See J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp. v. L.S. Brach Mfg. Corp., 78 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1935).
The Seventh Circuit termed the subordination agreement "collateral" and held that the
bankruptcy referee had discretion to avoid the issue. Id. at 532.
106. Calligar's often repeated four theories for collateral contracts are: (1) equitable
assignment, (2) equitable lien, (3) constructive trust, and (4) contractual promise with no
property overtones. Calligar, supra note 5, at 384. The first three theories are different ways
of expressing the same idea of equitable property defeasible by bona fide purchasers. This
idea has been criticized previously. See supra text accompanying notes 96-104. The fourth
theory is criticized, supra note 84 and accompanying text, for defeating a purpose of subor-
dination-security for the senior creditor.
107. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 7.7, at 214.
108. Doubt about the proper "theory" of enforcing subordination agreements led Con-
gress to provide for explicit jurisdiction over subordination agreements in § 510(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1982) ("A subordination agreement is enforceable
in a case under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law."). Section 510(a) overrules J. Henry Schroder v. L.S. Brach Mfg.
Corp., 78 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1935), which held that courts have discretion to abstain from
hearing disputed subordination claims. Section 510(a) also suggests that bankruptcy courts
must hear intercreditor suits for damages or property not in the bankrupt estate, a result
1004 [Vol. 38:975
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Suppose the junior creditor fails to file in bankruptcy in the hope
of defeating the senior creditor's double dividends.10 9 Although the
bankruptcy trustee has the power to file the junior claim on behalf
of the senior creditors, 110 it has a major disincentive against doing
so. If subordinations are assignments, the senior creditors will be
able to file for the junior creditor."'
Another useful doctrine pertains to the assignment of secured
debt. The standard rule is that the security interest travels with
the debt when the terms of the assignment are silent." 2 If subordi-
nations are assignments, then a subordination of debt by a junior
secured creditor should transfer the security interest to the senior
creditor. All of the reasons for inferring an assignment from a
promise not to receive payment dictate that the senior creditor
should obtain the junior creditor's security interest.13 The Second
that need not follow. In Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972), the
Supreme Court held that the liability of an indenture trustee to its debenture holders was
beyond the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. On this analogy, suits to recover damages
or improper payments from the junior creditor directly should be brought in state court.
Thus, in First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976), the senior creditor brought his suit for damages stemming from
discharge of the junior debt under federal diversity jurisdiction.
109. This failure to file could occur when the junior creditor has an equity stake in the
debtor. See In re Dodge-Freeman Poultry Co., 148 F. Supp. 647 (D.N.H. 1956), aff'd mem.
244 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1957). Waiver of the junior claim would increase the value of the
equity.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1982). The purpose of this provision is to strengthen the dis-
charge provisions applicable to individual bankruptcies. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 66, at
61.
111. The trustee's filing on behalf of a junior creditor would benefit senior creditors
with double dividends, but it would deplete the bankrupt estate to the detriment of general
creditors.
, Incidentally, the legislative history reflects the notion that junior creditors ordinarily
will not file a claim. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 66, at 5787, 5847 ("in situations where the
claim asserted would be subordinated and the creditor would not recover from the estate in
any event, filing of a proof of claim may simply not be necessary"). This remark overlooks
the possibility of double dividends for the senior creditors.
112. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 29-34 (1941); Epstein, Security Transfers by Se-
cured Parties, 4 GA. L. REv. 527, 533-39 (1970) (discussing the rationale for such a rule);
Jackson, Embodiment of Rights in Goods and the Concept of Chattel Paper, 50 U. CHL L.
REV. 1051, 1058 (1983) (same).
113. If the junior claim is secured and the entire debt is subordinated to the senior
creditor's claim, a court has three choices in disposing of the collateral. The court can keep
the collateral in the debtor's estate, can give the collateral to the senior creditor, or can let
the junior creditor have the collateral. The efficiency reasons discussed earlier eliminate the
option of keeping the collateral in the debtor's estate. See supra text accompanying notes
32-38. But see In re Pat Freeman, Inc., 42 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (choosing
this option in an equitable case). The choice between giving the collateral to the senior
creditor or letting the junior creditor keep it is not simple. This choice will depend on
whether the debtor gave the security interest to the junior creditor at a time when payment
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Circuit failed to recognize this logic, although it reached a fair re-
sult on other grounds. 14
The subordination equation also suggests who should vote jun-
ior claims in reorganizations. Treatment of junior creditor voting
rights should be identical to the rules governing a claim against a
debtor that the owner pledges to a secured party. The secured
party is entitled to vote the debt provided the pledgor has de-
faulted. The pledgor also has a claim against the debtor for any
surplus to which the secured party is not entitled is and so should
have voting rights commensurate with this surplus. 115 These rules
can be adapted to subordination without difficulty.""
of the junior claim would have been proper. See infra text accompanying notes 198-208. If
security is an improper payment, the collateral goes to the senior creditor.
114. Cherno v. Dutch Am. Mercantile Corp., 353 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1965). In Cherno
the junior creditor subordinated a secured claim and then falsely filed a statement of satis-
faction. Essentially, this action rendered the security interest unperfected and hence void in
bankruptcy. Id. at 152-53. On this score the Second Circuit was correct. The court also ruled
that subordination is not assignment, id. at 151, which creates the inefficiencies alluded to in
supra note 113.
115. Bankr. Rule 3001(e)(7), 11 U.S.C.A. 1984. One possible criticism of the assign-
ment theory is the effect of assigning stock in satisfaction of debt pursuant to a Chapter 11
reorganization, which the junior creditors must assign over to the senior creditors. Some
may fear that loading up the senior creditors with stock pursuant to an assignment theory
might force the debtor to report as income the discharge of debt that occurs in a chapter 11
reorganization. Chapter 11 forgiveness is not reportable income, unlike many other types of
debt forgiveness. I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(B). This exemption is made contingent upon no un-
secured creditor being more than twice as bad off as other unsecured creditors. Id. §
108(e)(8)(B) See Bergquist & Groff, Reorganizing the Fiancially Troubled Corporation Af-
ter the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 36 TAx L. REv. 517 (1981) (discussing the meaning of §
108(e)(8)(B)).
When stock is assigned over to the senior creditors as a replacement for double divi-
dends, it is in satisfaction of the junior debt. The proper calculation for the purposes of §
108(e)(8) requires that the percentage of stock allocated to the junior debt be compared
with the percentage of stock allocated to all other unsecured debt (without regard to the
effect of the subordination agreement). The fact that the senior creditors are entitled to
receive both types of stock does not prove there is discrimination in violation of §
108(e)(8)(B). The junior creditor's position is equivalent to a debenture holder who pledges
the instrument to a secured lender. The lender then becomes entitled to receive at least
some of the stock (up to the lender's secured claim against the debenture holder) if the
debenture holder is in default. No one would argue that the debenture owner is being dis-
criminated against for the purpose of § 108(e)(8)(B).
116. A tricky aspect of senior creditor claims is that the difference between the face
amount of the senior claim and the eventual senior dividend defines the claim secured by
the junior dividends. Therefore, this amount defines the senior creditor's right to vote the
junior claim. The junior creditor should vote the surplus. As a result, the face amount of the
junior claim for voting purposes never can be calculated without also calculating the result
of a hypothetical liquidation. This hypothetical exercise will be done eventually because a
court must determine whether a reorganization supplies each general creditor with at least
as much present value as it would have received in a liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)
(1982). The need to make the liquidation calculation for the purposes of determining the
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Finally, the equation of assignment and subordination solves
the problem of multiple subordinations 1  or subordination fol-
lowed by a more typical assignment. If Article 9 applies, the first
senior creditor to perfect or file a financing statement against the
junior creditor prevails."' In the states that have exempted subor-
dination from Article 9, the usual assignment rules dictate that the
first in time always prevails." 9 The second in time will receive only
the junior creditor's subrogation rights. 12 0
All of the solutions inspired by the rules for assignments ac-
cord with the purposes of subordination: to secure the senior claim
at the lowest cost to the junior creditor and the debtor and to cut
out free riding general creditors that have not paid for their subor-
dination rights.
B. The Junior Creditor as Article 9 Debtor
If subordination of debt is an assignment for security of a gen-
eral intangible by a nonrecourse guarantor, it falls within the Arti-
cle 9 definition of a security interest.12  Under Article 9 senior
amount of the junior vote, see id. § 1126(c) (providing for class voting by amount of claim),
undoubtedly will cause some administrative complexities. Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts
make summary estimations of value in other situations, 3 W. COLImER, BANKRUPTCY 1 56.07
(14th ed. 1984), and can do so here.
A more subtle issue is the classification of junior creditors for voting purposes. One
commentator, Cohn, supra note 27, has shown that junior creditors have an economic stake
that differs from other creditors. If junior creditors are not separately classified, they either
will dominate the voting or will be unfairly outvoted by creditors with different interests.
Separate classification for voting purposes does give junior creditors extra leverage when a
plan proposes to give shareholders some compensation without fully paying more senior
classes. Each dissenting class is entitled to full compensation before any lower class is paid.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1982) (absolute priority rule for cram-downs). The absolute pri-
ority rule dictates this tactical advantage, and bankruptcy policy against unfair discrimina-
tion demands separate classification except in de minimis cases.
117. Successive subordination of the same debt to competing senior creditors occurred
in First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 306 F. Supp. 593, 600 n.24 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), rev'd, 530 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976), although the court
had no occasion to determine priorities.
118. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1977). For a discussion of whether the UCC governs subordina-
tions, see infra text accompanying notes 121-53.
119. See supra note 82. Under the English rule, the first assignee to notify the debtor
has priority. In subordinations, however, the debtor usually will have notice of the subordi-
nated status of the debt.
120. Once the senior creditor that was first in time has been paid out, the second
senior creditor is a better recipient for subrogation rights than the junior creditor.
121. Article 9 applies "to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to
create a security in personal property .... U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1977). A security interest
is "an interest in personal property ... which secures payment or performance of an obliga-
tion." Id. § 1-201(37). Both the principal obligor and junior creditor guarantor qualify under
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creditors must perfect their rights if they are to survive the junior
creditor's bankruptcy. Commentators widely acknowledge that Ar-
ticle 9 perfection rules create difficulties for subordination agree-
ments. Nevertheless, leading commentators have urged the adop-
tion of new perfection rules and the continuation of Article 9
coverage in other respects. This section will show that the side ef-
fects of Article 9 are sufficiently disruptive of the subordination
relation to justify passage of proposed section 1-209, which takes
subordinations out of UCC coverage. In addition, when section 1-
209 is not in effect, the courts should ignore the literal words of the
UCC and rule that subordinated debt is not within the jurisdiction
of Article 9.
1. The Argument for UCC Coverage
Although noted coauthors Coogan, Kripke, and Weiss fully
recognized the difficulty of perfecting subordination rights under
existing Article 9 rules, 22 they nevertheless believed Article 9
should govern subordination because otherwise subordinations
would be vulnerable in the junior creditor's bankruptcy under non-
UCC rules.123 Their fear was based upon the much analyzed case of
Pioneer-Cafeteria Feeds, Ltd. v. Mack. 24 In Mack the senior cred-
itor had the right to pursue the junior creditor personally on the
guaranteed senior debt. Both the debtor and junior creditor filed
for bankruptcy. In the first bankruptcy, the senior and junior cred-
itors received double dividends. The senior creditor then made a
claim for the balance of the senior debt in the junior creditor's
bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a ruling that equitably
subordinated the senior creditor to all other creditors of the junior
creditor until they had received the amount that the senior credi-
tor had received in the first bankruptcy. To justify this view, the
the Article 9 definition of "debtor." Id. § 9-105(1)(d). In a subordination agreement the
debtor is not only an Article 9 debtor under § 9-105(1)(d), but is also the account debtor
under § 9-105(1)(a).
122. These authors point out that the secured party must perfect by possession when
the junior claim is represented by an instrument. Perfection by possession is difficult when
many junior creditors share the same claim. In addition, the Article 9 definition of instru-
ment excludes writings that are security agreements. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i) (1977). Hence, a
subordinated debenture with the subordination clause set forth cannot be an instrument
and must be perfected by filing.
Perfection by filing is complicated when there is a class of junior creditors. The debtor
must sign the financing statement. If an indenture trustee does not represent the class of
junior creditors, they all must sign. See Coogan, Kripke, & Weiss, supra note 14, at 242-47.
123. Id. at 253-55.
124. 340 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1965).
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court relied upon vague equitable grounds related to ostensible
ownership concerns regarding the subordination. 25
Coogan, Kripke, and Weiss were justified in finding ways to
circumvent the holding of Mack. Their solution was to amend the
UCC to provide more sensible perfection rules for subordina-
tions.12' Apparently they hoped that if state law viewed perfected
subordinations as adequately public, then the federal courts would
not proclaim subordinations to be frauds on creditors. 12 7
The Bankruptcy Code, however, has changed subordination
law considerably. Section 510(a) now provides that subordination
agreements are enforceable in bankruptcy to the same extent they
are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. To the extent
Mack represented a federal bankruptcy rule, section 510(a) has re-
pealed it. 12' Hence, the need for perfection at the state level has
disappeared, at least insofar as the need to appease federal policy.
The more general question remains whether subordination really
does create an ostensible ownership problem.
The equation of subordination to assignment is again instruc-
tive. Courts applying the New York rule 29 never have avoided as-
signments of debt on the grounds of ostensible ownership
problems. Courts applying the English or Massachusetts rule have
never done so once the debtor is notified of the assignment.13 0 No-
tice to the debtor serves as notice to the world because the debtor
always can be consulted on the existence of a prior assignment.
One argument why subordinations, as opposed to assignments,
might create ostensible ownership problems is that under many
contingent subordinations the junior creditor retains the right to
receive payments from the debtor. The typical common-law assign-
125. See Coogan, Kripke, & Weiss, supra note 14, at 248-49.
126. The suggested perfection rule for subordination would include the subordination
clause on the face of or in the title of an instrument or an Article 9 financing statement
when no instrument is involved. Id. at 258-59.
127. See Glenn, supra note 102, at 645-46. Under the New York rule, an assignment is
unassailable even before the obligor is notified. See supra note 82.
128. But see Heileson & Hirsch, supra note 102, at 557-59. Heileson and Hirsch assert
that Wyse lives on to threaten subordinations in the junior creditor's bankruptcy. They do
not justify their views in light of § 510(a), which explicitly overrules bankruptcy equities.
129. Under the New York rule, priorities are decided strictly according to the princi-
ple of "first in time is first in right." See supra note 103. See text accompanying supra note
103 and supra note 82.
130. Under the English and Four Horsemen rule, the assignor retains a power to cre-
ate good title in a second assignee until the debtor is notified of the assignment. These rules
therefore establish a sort of perfection requirement for assignees. See supra note 103. See
text accompanying supra note 103 and supra note 82.
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ment contemplates an immediate right in the assignee to collect.
Retention of the right to collect by the assignor has made assign-
ments for security suspect. 131 Assignments for security and debt
subordinations are fundamentally different, however. In subordina-
tions the debtor is usually aware of the subordination and can be
consulted as to its existence. In the typical assignment for security,
as in nonnotification accounts financing, usually the debtor is una-
ware that a secured party is in the picture. The debtor's lack of
notice is what gives rise to ostensible ownership problems. Ostensi-
ble ownership concerns never have sunk an assignment of a chose
in action when the debtor has notice. 32
Much of the incentive for bringing subordinations under Arti-
cle 9 disappears if one concedes that subordination does not give
rise to significiant ostensible ownership concerns. In addition,
three undesirable side effects of continued Article 9 coverage indi-
cate that the common law of assignments provides a much better
source of rules.
First, the priority rules of Article 9 are different from assign-
ment priorities. Under Article 9, if the second senior creditor is the
first to perfect,13 3 it has priority to the bankruptcy dividends when
the distribution occurs. Furthermore, this priority holds true when
it has knowledge of the subordination to the first senior creditor,
or when the subordination language is printed on the face of the
instrument. Priorities under Article 9 favor the first party to per-
fect regardless of the second secured party's knowledge. 134 Under
131. The assignor's retention of the right to collect destroyed the assignment under
the infamous rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 360 (1925) ("Under the law of New
York [sic] a transfer of property as security which reserves to the transferor the right to
dispose of the same, or to apply the proceeds thereof, for his own uses is, as to creditors,
fraudulent in law and void.").
In Professor Gilmore's chapter discussing Benedict v. Ratner, he develops the point
that the above-quoted rule was based not merely upon secrecy, but upon the requirement
that the accounts financier closely police the debtor by controlling the payments received
from credit customers. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 8.3, at 257-61. Thus, a decision by the
accounts financier to take a bigger risk by not policing meant that the assignment for secur-
ity was void against creditors, even when the assignment was highly public. The second
branch of Benedict v. Ratner (overruled in UCC § 9-205), was limited to accounts and in-
ventory cases. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 8.4, at 265.
132. Rockmore v. Lehman, 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1942); In
re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 25 F. Supp. 874, 877 (D. Conn. 1938). These cases both upheld
assignments for security when the assignor could collect until default.
133. On Article 9 perfection rules, see supra note 123. Under Article 9, an assignee for
security of an account or general intangible cannot perfect by notifying the obligor, as it
could under the English rule for assignment priorities. See supra note 85.
134. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1977). Professor Nickles believes that the second secured
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Article 9, senior creditors usually must perfect to save their right
to double dividends. This problem is especially acute when the
junior claim is an Article 8 security. Section 8-321(1) states that an
unperfected security interest in an Article 8 security is no security
interest at all.1 5 Under Article 8 buyers of the subordinated de-
benture technically take free of the subordination rights of the
senior creditors. At least under Article 9, initial buyers of the jun-
ior claim would be subject to unperfected security interests of
which they had knowledge. 136 In contrast, the common-law assign-
ment priorities always protect the original senior creditor. No sub-
sequent assignee can take priority137 once the obligor has notice of
the assignment.
Second, under Article 9 senior creditors face an alarming limi-
tation on their rights against buyers of the junior instrument. Sec-
tion 9-307(3) prevents senior creditors from making future ad-
vances forty-five days after the sale of the junior instrument. 38
Subordination agreements frequently contemplate expandable
classes of senior creditors and unlimited ability of individual senior
creditors to advance more funds on a senior basis, but section 9-
307(3) may bring this practice to a halt. The administrative bur-
dens on both a bankruptcy trustee and an indenture trustee would
be prodigious if section 9-307(3) applied in these situations. The
trustees would have to disallow future advances at different times
for each subordinated instrument traded.13 9
party's knowledge is always relevant. Nickles, supra note 86, at 72-103. These views deserve
more attention.
135. See U.C.C. § 8-321(1) (1977).
136. See id. § 9-301(1)(c) & (d). Under these provisions, subordination clauses set
forth in the instrument should put buyers on notice. These sections assume that the sale is
out of the ordinary course of business. Section 9-307(1) covers sales in the ordinary course of
business. In § 9-307(1) the buyer's knowledge is once again irrelevant. Id. This provision
might apply when the underwriter sells the subordinated debenture. Only security interests
"created by [the] seller" are destroyed by § 9-307(1). The underwriter may be a party to the
creation of a security interest when an indenture created the interest. Hence, public issue of
subordinated debentures might come under § 9-307(1) making the buyer's knowledge of a
prior interest irrelevant.
Application of § 9-301(1)(c) to subordination cases is subject to two problems. First, §
9-301(1)(c) does not explicitly cover sales in the ordinary course of business. Second, § 9-
301(1)(c) does not explicitly kill security interests but merely subordinates them to the
rights of the buyer. These drafting glitches should be ignored, and § 9-301(1)(c) should be
viewed as a provision that kills unperfected security interests. See Carlson, Death and Sub-
ordination Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Senior Buyers and Senior
Lien Creditors, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 547 (1984).
137. See supra note 82.
138. See U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1977).
139. This Code analysis presumes that the rule against future advances in § 9-307(3)
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Third, if junior creditors sell their subordinated debentures,
the sales price they receive technically constitutes proceeds under
section 9-306(1).140 Application of Article 9 suggests that these pro-
ceeds become available to senior creditors after default. Most in-
vestors in subordinated debt instruments would be quite shocked
to learn that, years after they sold out, the money proceeds they
received must be surrendered to senior creditors. The expansive
proceeds rule of Article 9 is the most compelling reason why subor-
dinations should be taken out of Article 9.
To summarize, some scholars have defended applying Article 9
to subordinations on the theory that subordinations are secret
liens that the junior creditor's bankruptcy should destroy. 41 But
the side effects of Article 9 coverage-priorities against subsequent
creditors and buyers, future advance rules, and encumbrances
upon sales proceeds-should be avoided. Moreover, the ability of
creditors of junior creditors to inquire of the common debtor con-
cerning the nature and value of a general intangible diminishes os-
tensible ownership problems.
2. The Solution
The legislative exemption recommended in 1966 by the Per-
manent Editorial Board offers the best solution to the side effects
of Article 9 coverage of subordinations. The recommended section
1-209 reads:
An obligation may be issued as subordinated to payment of another obli-
gation of the person obligated, or a creditor may subordinate his right to pay-
ment of an obligation by agreement with either the person obligated or an-
other creditor of the person obligated. Such a subordination does not create a
security interest as against either the common debtor or a subordinated cred-
itor. This section shall be construed as declaring the law as it existed prior to
the enactment of this section and not as modifying it.142
Only seventeen states have passed section 1-209,14' but they in-
clude commercially important jurisdictions. Knowledgeable law-
yers often can use choice of law clauses to guarantee that section 1-
applies to Article 8 securities as well as to security interests covered only by Article 9. See
id. § 8-321(3).
140. Id. § 9-306(1).
141. E.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 37.3, at 997-98.
142. U.C.C. § 1-209 (1977).
143. States adopting § 1-209 include: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. § 1-209, 1 U.L.A. 50 (Supp.
1984).
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209 applies to their loan agreement. This solution, however, re-
quires a reasonable connection between the transaction and the
choice of law.144 In any case, commercial law ought to supply rules
that most creditors want. A commercial rule that requires lawyers
to stipulate out of it imposes wasteful negotiation costs.
Two nonstatutory suggestions may solve the problem of Arti-
cle 9 coverage of subordination. First, some commentators have al-
leged that certain subordination transactions do not fit within the
UCC definition of security interests. 145 This argument is that when
the debtor issues the debt in subordinated form, the junior creditor
"grants" no rights when it first creates a subordination. Ab initio,
the junior creditor enters into a "limited debt." Ab initio subordi-
nations therefore do not constitute proprietary transfers-only
subsequently created subordinations do. The limited debt argu-
ment succeeds in excluding subordinated debentures from Article
9 coverage, which eliminates the most severe disruption that the
UCC imposes on the credit market.
The limited debt solution, however, cannot withstand scru-
tiny. All subordination agreements, whether ab initio or subse-
quent, fit within the UCC definition of security interest. A junior
creditor holding a subordinated debenture is analogous to the
debtor in purchase money financing or nonnotification accounts re-
ceivable financing concerning after-acquired property. As soon as
the debtor obtains collateral, his rights are subject to the secured
creditor's superior rights. No one would argue that after-acquired
accounts are subject only to a limitation on the account debtor's
obligation to pay and therefore are not encumbered by any secur-
ity interest. The instantaneous encumbrance of newly obtained
property is a common Article 9 concept and therefore cannot be
used to exempt ab initio subordinations from the UCC definitions
of security interests.
If courts must do violence to the literal words of the UCC, it
would be simpler to declare that Article 9 does not apply to subor-
dination of debt. No reason exists to apply Article 9 priorities out
of blind adherence to statutory words when the result is bad policy
that the legislature would not endorse.146 Nevertheless, this sugges-
144. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1977).
145. The distinction between original and subsequent subordinations is developed in
Coogan, Kripke, & Weiss, supra note 14, at 238-47 and Zinman, supra note 91, at 7.
146. For a good essay on ignoring the express words of the UCC to achieve broad
commercial law purposes, see Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code:
UCC Section 1-103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 655, 685-86
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tion runs counter to the notion that Article 9 applies to any trans-
action, "regardless of its form," that creates a security interest. 147
The real thrust of this rhetoric is aimed at the parties to specific
transactions. Original parties should not be able to defeat third
parties by changing the form of their relation. The rhetoric should
not discourage courts from interpreting the statute in a reasonable
manner.
148
Exempting subordination from Article 9 coverage, whether by
section 1-209 or judicial fiat, does not eliminate completely the
threat of the junior creditor's bankruptcy. A subsequent subordi-
nation still could be a fraudulent transfer. A failing junior creditor
should not be able to subordinate a claim upon the common debtor
without receiving fair consideration from the senior creditors.1 49 In
(1977). An interesting description of "hermeneutics" and their use in finding legislative in-
tent appears in Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. Rav. 781, 798-804 (1983).
147. U.C.C. § 9-102 (1977). See Serf v. Leff, 38 Bankr. 571, 575 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984); Coogan, Kripke, & Weiss, supra note 14, at 246 ("[E]ven if there is no explicit agree-
ment between the parties that a security interest is to be created, the law will infer this
result from what they did intend."); see also 2 G. GmmoR, supra note 7, § 37.3, at 996-97.
Gilmore asserts that
The whole point and purpose of Article 9 was to bring to an end the pre-Code prolifer-
ation of "independent" security devices. A creditor who wants to claim priority over
other creditors in specific assets should no more be able to avoid the perfection require-
ments of the Article by calling his arrangement "subordination agreement" than he
could be calling it "consignment," "lease," "trust" or whatnot.
Id.
148. Cf. Serf v. Leff, 38 Bankr. 571, 576 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
149. A subordination is the transfer of rights by a junior creditor to a senior creditor.
Transfers for the benefit of third parties are not always made for "fair consideration" under
the fraudulent transfer provisions of the bankruptcy laws. Smiley Professional Ass'n v.
Phelps, 484 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1973); Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 468 F.2d 11 (7th
Cir. 1972). Compare In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 609 (2d Cir.) (guaranty of loan to
subsidiary "probably" not a fraudulent conveyance by parent, for purposes of fairness of
class action settlement), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983), with In re Associated Gas & Elec.
Co., 61 F. Supp. 11, 34 (S.D.N.Y.) (subordination probably a fraudulent conveyance for pur-
poses of settlement), af'd, 149 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945).
Ordinarily, extension of credit by senior creditors to an entity in which the junior credi-
tor has a claim should constitute consideration. Whether it is "fair" consideration will de-
pend on the circumstances. When the class of senior creditors includes those that extended
credit before subordination and when the issuance of the debt itself did not supply consid-
eration-that is, it was an ab initio subordination, fair consideration becomes problematic.
The junior creditor receives nothing from preexisting creditors.
Aldrich v. Redington, 605 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1978), might be used by preexisting senior
creditors to avoid fraudulent conveyance liability. In that case the Second Circuit refused to
let a subordinated junior creditor rescind for fraud. Senior creditors could have estopped
the junior creditors from rescinding if they could have proved reliance. The Second Circuit
ruled that imposing a burden of proving reliance on a large class of senior creditors was
tantamount to denying the subordination right altogether. It noted that the purpose of the
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addition, subordination might be a preference15" or a violation of
negative pledge convenants that the junior creditor might have
made in unrelated loan agreements.1 5 The bankruptcy of the jun-
ior creditor may be consolidated with the bankruptcy of an affili-
ated common debtor-in which case the junior debt and double
dividends would disappear.1 5 2 Nevertheless, with Article 9 out of
the picture, at least subordination should stand up against the hy-
pothetical lien creditor status of the junior creditor's bankruptcy
net capital rules of the New York Stock Exchange, pursuant to which the subordination
agreement had been signed, was to protect stockbroker customers. The junior creditors
knew this. Hence, reliance was not required, even for senior creditors that were not custom-
ers within the statute. This same analysis could be used in response to a fraudulent convey-
ance claim by a junior creditor's trustee.
The Second Circuit's opinion is based squarely on the customer-protective purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act. The Ninth Circuit applied the same analysis outside the con-
text of the Act. In re Holiday Mart, Inc., 715 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1983). But see Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 685 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to
follow Weis when no regulatory goal was at stake).
The presence of fair consideration removes the risk of fraudulent transfer liability of
the senior creditors. Although subordinations in exchange for fair consideration still could
be a fraudulent conveyance if the junior and senior creditors intend to deceive nonsenior
creditors, 11 U.S.C. 548 (a)(1) (1982), no ostensible ownership concerns exist to cause a
bankruptcy court to disallow subordination rights. See supra text accompanying notes 122-
32.
150. Difficult preference issues exist when the class of senior creditors is large. Credi-
tors preexisting the subordination all have received a transfer of the junior creditor's prop-
erty on antecedent debt. The subordination may constitute a voidable preference if made
when the junior creditor was insolvent and within 90 days of bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §
547(b) (1982). A different preference risk is imposed when the subordination is made contin-
gent on regulatory approval. Verace v. New York Stock Exch., 478 F. Supp. 1061, 1065
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). Such a clause creates a "springing lien" that transfers ownership of the
junior claim only when approval is obtained. A preference risk is created for senior creditors
whose claims are approved by the Exchange while the junior creditor is insolvent. From the
senior creditor's point of view, the better practice is to have the subordination immediately
effective but to defer permission to the stockbroker to exclude the subordinated claim from
debt for net capital purposes.
151. Coogan, Kripke, & Weiss, supra note 14, at 256-57; cf. In re Associated Gas &
Elec. Co., 61 F. Supp. 11, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (downstream guaranty thought to violate nega-
tive pledge covenants), aff'd, 149 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Elias v. Clarke,
326 U.S. 736 (1945). Some authorities have asserted that when the secured party knows of
the negative pledge covenant at the time of the security agreement, the security interest is
voidable at the behest of the creditors to whom the covenant was made. 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 7, § 38.2. Under this theory creditors with enforcement rights would be able to
recover double dividends from the senior creditors.
152. Cf. In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d 921, 927-28 (10th Cir. 1979) (consolidation
would eliminate intracorporate guarantees). Elimination of guarantees was sufficient to con-
vince the Gulfco court to reverse the lower court's consolidation order, but the court hinted
that even the elimination of the guaranty should not justify a rejection of consolidation
under some circumstances, including the hopeless commingling of assets. Id. at 929-30. See
generally Conti, An Analytical Model for Substantial Consolidation of Bankruptcy Cases,
38 Bus. LAw. 855 (1983) (discussing the standards for consolidation).
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C. The Suretyship Aspects of Subordination
Subordination resembles a specialized assignment of a nonre-
course variety in which the junior creditor guarantor puts up col-
lateral to secure the debt of the principal obligor, but does not
agree to be personally liable.15 4 The equation of subordination and
nonrecourse suretyship is acceptable provided courts use surety-
ship rules with great care in order to preserve the precise benefits
and burdens of the subordination relation.
One important suretyship doctrine prohibits the benefited
creditor from increasing the risk by enlarging the size of its debt155
or by lengthening the maturity of the loan.156 This rule is unrealis-
tic for subordinations with an open class of senior creditors. These
classes can expand as new senior creditors extend credit to the
common debtor. It would be highly anomalous to permit new sen-
ior creditors to enter the class, but prohibit old creditors from ex-
tending new credit on a senior basis.15 7
153. The common law of assignment dictates that the trustee, as hypothetical lien
creditor, cannot prevail. Courts usually hold that a subsequent lien creditor loses to a prior
assignee unless the obligor pays the lien creditor without knowledge of the previous assign-
ment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1979). Because the common debtor al-
most certainly will know of the subordination, this theory seldom will help the junior credi-
tor's trustee avoid the subordination agreement.
Two authors, assuming that Calligar's four theories of subordination might be viable,
see supra note 106, argue that if the "contractual" theory of subordination is adopted, then
senior creditors might have no property interest in double dividends that could be senior to
a hypothetical lien. At best, the senior creditor would have an unsecured claim against the
junior creditor for the amount of the dividends. Hieleson & Hirsh, supra note 102, at 565.
This point suggests that the true nature of subordination does matter. A casual attitude
about the theories of subordination has harmful results.
154. Coogan, Kripke, & Weiss, supra note 14, at 236 n.25. See Vintero Corp. v.
Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 735 F.2d 740, 742 (2d Cir. 1984) (describing security
interests granted by nonrecourse guarantors); Cohn, supra note 27, at 313 (suggesting this
analogy for purposes of classifying claims in reorganization).
155. Atterbury v. Carpenter, 321 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1963); RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §
128 (1941).
156. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 129 (1941).
157. Both Gilmore and Calligar believe that if the senior creditor has a security inter-
est that he later releases, there should be a "pro tanto release [of] the unsecured
subordinator from his duties under the subordination agreement just as it would release a
surety." 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 7, at 985-86 n.10; Calligar, supra note 5, at 383-84; see
also First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 306 F. Supp. 593, 605 n.47 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), rev'd, 530 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976). Release of the security
interest by the benefited creditor in a suretyship agreement increases the risk to the surety
and is therefore not permitted. Application of this surety rule to subordination also suggests
that senior creditors must be debarred from increasing the size of the senior debt. Such
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A junior creditor that subordinates to a single senior creditor,
however, may intend to accept a much smaller risk than the junior
creditor that subordinates to a class of senior creditors.158 This in-
tent is particularly likely with complete subordinations, in which
the junior creditor agrees to not receive any payment until a spe-
cific designated senior claim disappears. In this case, it is impor-
tant to limit the power of the debtor and senior creditor to in-
crease the risk to the junior creditor.5 9
One of the traditional remedies for unauthorized increase of
risk to the surety is discharge of the suretyship contract. This rule
is harsh even in a suretyship context. In Atterbury v. Carpenter60
a surety guaranteed a bank loan for $45,000. In order to save the
failing business, the bank advanced an additional $50,000. The
court ruled that the entire surety contract was discharged because
the benefited creditor's claim was increased. The court should have
held that the guaranteed claim continued to be $45,000. The new
$50,000 loan should have had no effect on the suretyship contract.
An unrelated bank could have advanced the $50,000 without dis-
charging the surety. That the benefited creditor made the advance
did not affect the risk actually undertaken by the surety, provided
the surety was not liable on the new advance.
Application of the rule of Atterbury v. Carpenter to subordi-
nation agreements would be as illogical as it is in more familiar
suretyship contexts. Unless the debtor covenants against further
rules make no sense when the junior creditor has accepted the risk that senior debt could be
expanded. Release of security by senior creditors was found to be permissible in In re W.T.
Grant Co., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 54, 58-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also In re W.T.
Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 613-14 (2d Cir.) (senior creditors had right to increase size of senior
debt), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983); Briggs v. Southern Bakeries Co., 227 Ga. 663, 182
S.E.2d 459 (1971) (hinting, however, that extended maturity would have been wrongful to
junior creditors in a complete subordination).
158. A major theme of subordination of real estate mortgages is limitation of risk. A
line of California cases holds that a lien subordination agreement is unconscionable unless
the junior claim specifically is limited in risk. See, e.g., Handy v. Gordon, 65 Cal. 2d 578, 422
P.2d 329, 55 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1967); Lambe, Enforceability of Subordination Agreements, 19
REAL PROP., PROS. & TR. J. 631, 636-38 (1984).
159. Authority may exist in opposition to the principle that subordination to specified
debt inherently is limited. In First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d
450, 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976), the Second Circuit required the senior
creditor to protect itself with an express contractual provision against discharge of the jun-
ior debt. The refusal of the court to imply prebankruptcy duties on the junior creditor sug-
gests that it would refuse to imply duties on senior creditors as well. But this wooden resort
to drafting burdens is tantamount to the court's abdication of its role to explore the pur-
poses and expectation of the parties to the subordination agreement. See Bratton, Interpre-
tation of Contracts, supra note 16, at 390.
160. 321 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1963).
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nonsenior debt, a senior creditor should be allowed to advance
nonsenior credit without discharging the subordination or any
other suretyship contract.16'
Extension of maturity has posed great difficulties for surety-
ship doctrine. The basic principle is still the same: the benefited
creditor may not increase the risk to the surety by extending the
maturity of the assured claim.16 2 Extended maturities also pose a
challenge when junior creditors intend to limit their subordination
obligations to specific senior claims. Most complete subordinations
will fall into this category. Extending the maturity of a senior
claim prejudices the junior creditor by prolonging its inability to
collect its own claim. Some limits on the powers of senior creditors
to extend the maturity of their claim should exist.
Suretyship rules do provide some useful suggestions to sort
out abusive and permissible maturity extensions. First, a distinc-
tion exists between genuine extension of maturity and mere collec-
tion delays. By extension of maturity, the courts contemplate a le-
gal disability of the benefited creditor to collect from the common
debtor until the new maturity date. Simple delay in collecting does
not discharge the surety. A surety always may pay off the benefited
creditor and pursue the debtor in a more diligent fashion. 6 3
The purpose behind an extension of maturity should be mate-
rial. 6 4 Any purpose to prevent the junior creditor from collecting
should make the extension a breach of the senior creditor's duty to
the junior creditor. An extension with the purpose and effect of
increasing the chances of the debtor to survive-for instance, a
loan workout-should not discharge the subordination agreement.
The chief aim in this factual inquiry should be to determine
whether the risk to the junior creditor is increased.'0 5
161. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Giesow, 412 F.2d 468, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1969) (senior
claim was a performance bond; payments to subcontractors that need not have been made
were not part of the senior claim but did not discharge the subordination agreement); Miller
v. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 248 Cal. App. 2d 655, 56 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1967) (in a lien
subordination agreement, nonsenior advance did not discharge junior creditor's obligation).
162. 10 S. WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1222 (3d ed. 1967).
163. Id. § 1231.
164. Once again, a modification of suretyship case law is necessary before even this
modest statement can be accepted. Traditionally, courts have cancelled suretyship contracts
when the maturity is extended regardless of the reason. Id. § 1222. The rule for compen-
sated sureties is different. The compensated surety must show that the extension is actually
prejudicial. Id. By compensated sureties, usually courts contemplated an insurance company
in the business of giving guaranties. Id. § 1213. The discussion in the text presupposes that
courts will apply the rules for compensated sureties to subordinations.
165. Gluskin v. Atlantic Says. & Loan Ass'n, 32 Cal. App. 3d 307, 314, 108 Cal. Rptr.
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D. Lien Subordination Contrasted
Strong justifications for an assignment theory of debt subordi-
nation exist, but they do not apply to lien subordinations. A gen-
eral demotion theory is more appropriate when the junior creditor
is a secured party and does no more than concede priority to an-
other secured party as to collateral supplied by the debtor.
The Second Circuit has assumed the opposite is true for both
debt and lien subordinations. It has proclaimed that, without an
express grant of bankruptcy dividends, a promise to receive no
payment on the junior claim is not an assignment of the claim. 6
In addition, it has characterized subordination of lien priority as
an assignment.16 7 Because assignees can rely upon the perfecting
acts of assignors to establish their priority,'68 the Second Circuit
permitted an unperfected security interest to survive the debtor's
bankruptcy. Coogan, Kripke, and Weiss support the Second Cir-
cuit in this latter regard. They believe that subordination agree-
ments under section 9-316 of the UCC come within the definition
of a security interest."6 9 For this to be true, lien subordination
318, 323 (1973). For a case following the approach suggested in the text, see Briggs v. South-
ern Bakeries Co., 227 Ga. 663, 182 S.E.2d 459 (1971). In Briggs a class of junior creditors
promised not to receive payment until a bank was paid on its secured loan. The senior claim
matured in 1972, but the senior creditor had the right to insist that the debtor use the
proceeds of collateral to pay the senior claim early. The senior creditor, however, permitted
the sale of collateral without reducing the senior claim. Instead, the debtor was permitted to
maintain a compensating balance with the senior creditor.
The junior creditor claimed that the subordination agreement should be cancelled. The
junior creditor argued that the debtor would have paid the senior debt early if the senior
creditor had exercised its rights over the collateral. The court properly ruled that the junior
creditors accepted a risk of an outstanding senior claim until 1972. The actions of the senior
creditor and debtor did not materially affect that risk.
If an extension of time is found to be wrongful, the remedy might be discharge of the
subordination obligation. Here, the increased risk cannot be segregated out, as it could be
when the senior creditor made an unauthorized future advance.
166. See supra notes 72-95 and accompanying text.
167. Citibank, N.A. v. Tele/Resources, Inc., 724 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'g on other
grounds 21 Bankr. 358, 364 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[The senior creditor's] failure to file a
.. . financing statement to perfect its claim.., is not fatal to its position in this case ....
What is lacking in this case is a writing signed by [the junior creditor] to prove the existence
of an assignment or subordination.").
To add to the irony, another court held that lien subordination should not be deemed
an assignment, In re Henzler, 36 Bankr. 303 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984), but relied on the
Second Circuit's view of debt subordination to conclude that lien subordinations are never
assignments under any circumstances. Id. at 305-06 (citing Cherno v. Dutch Am. Mercantile
Corp., 353 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1965)).
168. U.C.C. § 9-302(2) (1977).
169. Coogan, Kripke, & Weiss, supra note 14, at 259-61. This view is supported by
Professor Osborne in the context of subordinated real estate mortgages. 4 AmERicAN LAW OF
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must be synonymous with assignment of the underlying debt.17 0
There are three reasons why contractual lien subordination
should be a demotion or waiver instead of an assignment. First,
contractual lien subordination cannot be reconciled with tradi-
tional doctrines pertaining to assignments. Although this is the
least satisfactory of the reasons, it is presented first in order to
illustrate more clearly the policy reasons that follow. Second, the
economic justifications that militated for an assignment theory of
debt subordination do not militate for a similar view of lien subor-
dination. Third, a demotion theory best comports with the bank-
ruptcy policy against permitting unperfected security interests
from surviving the debtor's bankruptcy.
1. Lien Subordination Cannot Be Reconciled Easily With
Assignment Doctrine
In a lien subordination agreement, the only collateral for ei-
ther the senior or junior claims is the property that the debtor has
offered both parties as collateral. The junior claim, which is prop-
erty of the junior secured party, is not collateral for the senior
claim. The junior secured party does not promise to receive no
payment on the junior claim. It may receive unencumbered cash
from the debtor without violating any rights of the senior secured
party. Ifthe collateral were to disappear, the senior and junior se-
cured parties would be equal general creditors of the debtor. In
these respects, lien subordination differs from debt subordination.
It is difficult to reconcile the two familiar assignment doctrines
with lien subordination agreements. First, liens cannot be assigned
separately from the underlying debt.17 1 Second, once the debtor
has been notified that a chose in action has been assigned, only
payments to the assignee will extinguish the debt.172 If the junior
secured party's claim is not itself collateral for the senior claim,
then the lien subordination agreement separates the lien from the
underlying debt. This is an impossibility under traditional assign-
ment theory. Furthermore, payments made by the debtor to the
senior secured party do not extinguish the junior claim. After the
PROPERTY § 16.106D, at 215-16 (1952).
170. Coogan, Kripke, & Weiss, supra note 14, at 260 (lien subordination "appears to
be a transfer and, unless perfected, potentially vulnerable in the subordinator's bank-
ruptcy"). The authors proposed to make lien subordination automatically perfected security
interests in order to avoid this alleged problem. See id. at 258.
171. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 29 Comment (1941).
172. See RESTATEENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 338 (1979).
[Vol. 38:9751020
THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL DEBT
senior claim is satisfied from the proceeds of the collateral, the
junior claim survives as an unsecured claim against the debtor.
The problem with these observations is that it is possible to
imagine a complicated interpretation of lien subordination that
satisfies the doctrinal requirements of assignment without violating
the expectations of the parties. For instance, lien subordination
could mean that the junior secured creditor could make a partial
assignment of its entire secured claim (both debt and lien) so that
the senior secured party is completely paid off. Meanwhile, the
junior secured party is subrogated to an equivalent amount of the
senior creditor's claim (both lien and debt). But the forthcoming
policy reasons strongly suggest the adoption of a demotion theory,
not a complicated assignment-plus-subrogation theory, for lien
subordinations.
2. The Economics of Lien Subordination Militate for a
Demotion Theory
If debt subordination is an assignment of the junior claim,
subordination benefits are denied to free-riding, nonsenior credi-
tors. Accordingly, the assignment theory is more lucrative for the
senior creditors and cheaper for the junior creditors."
None of these statements is true for lien subordination. If the
junior secured party is demoted, so that it collects from the collat-
eral after the senior secured party, general creditors receive no
benefits because the general creditors have no right to the collat-
eral. Demotion in this context creates no free-rider effect.
The demotion theory also does not increase the cost of the lien
subordination, as it would increase the cost of debt subordination.
To the contrary, the assignment theory would increase the cost if
used to permit the senior creditor to obtain rights to the junior
claim. The ability of a junior creditor to pursue the debtor person-
ally, in spite of a lien subordination agreement, makes lien subor-
dination less expensive than debt subordination. Loss of the right
through an assignment theory would increase the cost of lien
subordination.
Once again, it is possible to interpret lien subordination agree-
ments consistently with assignment doctrine without also entitling
the senior creditor to the junior creditor's personal rights against
the debtor. The lien subordination could be a swap of the junior
creditor's entire claim with the senior creditor's claim, limited to
173. See supra text accompanying notes 29-52.
1985] 1021
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:975
the value of the security. In other words, if the junior creditor's
lien claim is more than the value of the collateral, the junior claim
would be divided into a secured and unsecured portion, with only
the secured portion assigned to the senior creditor. In exchange,
the junior creditor becomes subrogated to the senior creditor's
claim, which would be unsecured. Such a complicated theory would
preserve the junior secured party's personal rights against the
debtor while remaining true to assignment doctrine. Assignment
doctrine, however, was partially justified by cutting out nonsenior
creditors from subordination benefits. No such justification exists
for lien subordination. Thus, the complicated assignment-subroga-
tion theory serves no purpose. In addition, the theory would inter-
fere with bankruptcy policy against the survival of unperfected se-
curity interests, which is the subject of the next section.174
3. A Demotion Theory of Lien Subordination Fits Better with
Bankruptcy Policy Against Unperfected Liens
A key difference between debt subordination and lien subordi-
nation is that lien subordination presupposes that both the senior
and junior creditors have liens. 17 5 The parties to a debt subordina-
174. A subordination agreement between two mortgagees should not be viewed as an
assignment, but when the junior creditor is a lessor, not a mortgagee, an assignment of
property does exist.
In Lambe, supra note 159, at 633, the author describes the typical real estate subordi-
nation agreement as follows. The owner of undeveloped land either sells or leases the land
to a developer. If the land is sold, the seller retains a purchase money mortgage. If the land
is leased, the lessor retains a reversion. In either case, the developer commonly needs con-
struction financing. The landowner, therefore, agrees to subordinate the mortgage or the
reversion to the rights of the construction mortgagee. Mr. Lambe assumes that the same
theory of subordination is applicable whether the retained interest is a mortgage or a rever-
sion. Characterization of lien subordination as waiver in this Article, however, works only
for intermortgage agreements. When the landowner retains a reversion, it does more than
merely cede administrative control of the sale to the senior creditor. It essentially agrees to
sell the reversion, not otherwise susceptible to foreclosure, to satisfy the senior claim. This
agreement appears to be the grant of a mortgage by a nonrecourse guarantor. Accordingly,
the "subordination agreement" pertaining to the reversion should be recorded against the
landlord to preserve the senior creditor's mortgage on the reversion.
175. The case may arise in which a secured party agrees to subordinate his lien to the
lien of another creditor when the second creditor neglects to get a security interest. In this
case, the second creditor has not performed the minimal acts necessary to take advantage of
the subordination agreement. That is, the second creditor's right to priority is contingent
upon the second creditor's getting security froni the common debtor. An example will
demonstrate why this is so.
Suppose JC promises to subordinate his $50 lien in the $100 collateral to SC, in order
to induce SC to lend $50 to D, the debtor. SC makes the loan but neglects to obtain a
security interest from D. D defaults on JC's loan, and JC repossesses and liquidates the
collateral. SC may try to claim that JC is estopped from asserting JC's priority to the $100,
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tion need not hold secured claims. When a secured party promises
to subordinate his debt, however, the entire junior claim, together
with the accompanying lien, is assigned to the senior creditor as
security for the senior claim.'78
If subordination is an assignment, then the senior creditor
should be able to rely on the perfecting acts of the junior credi-
tor. 17 7 When a secured party subordinates its debt, the perfecting
acts of the junior creditor serve to put the world on notice that one
security interest exists. There is no reason for the senior creditor to
perfect a second time. Although the identity of the secured party
will not be apparent from the records, creditors of the debtor will
know at least that an encumbrance exists.
The senior secured party in a lien subordination should per-
fect separately so that the creditors will know that two encum-
brances exist. This is perhaps the most important reason why con-
sensual lien subordination should not be an assignment. If the
senior secured party has neglected to perfect its security interest,
the debtor's bankruptcy trustee should be able to avoid the un-
perfected lien by use of the strong-arm power in section 544(a). In
contrast, an assignment theory could be used to excuse the senior
secured party from putting creditors on notice that a second en-
cumbrance exists.
The alternative to the demotion theory proposed here is the
assignment-plus-subrogation theory in which the two secured par-
ties simply trade claims. Under this view, the junior secured party
might give up its perfected lien to the senior secured party and
might receive the unperfected lien in return by subrogation. This
approach would protect the general creditors of the debtor because
only one of the two security interests would survive the trustee's
avoidance powers. But it is probably unfair to the junior creditor.
The rule puts the burden of failing to perfect on the junior creditor
and holds the senior creditor harmless from errors made in the
but JC has not promised to waive his security interest altogether. He has promised only
that SC has the first drink at the trough. If JC gives SC the first $50 and retains the second
$50 for himself, D justifiably will complain that JC is giving away D's property without D's
consent. The only answer is that SC has no rights to the collateral because D never trans-
ferred a security interest. See Wilmot v. Central Okla. Gravel Corp., 620 P.2d 1350, 1355
(Okla. App. 1980).
176. This statement applies to security interests received at a time when prepayment
of the junior claim was not allowed. If the junior creditor may accept precontingency pay-
ments from the debtor, it may also receive security. This distinction is developed infra in
the text accompanying notes 203-10.
177. U.C.C. § 9-302(2) (1977).
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perfecting process. An assignment theory would therefore make
the junior creditor the guarantor of the senior creditor's perfecting
steps. The only defense of this result is if each and every party to a
lien subordination knew the rules. But this assumption of knowl-
edge cannot be made. In addition, it puts extra duties upon the
junior secured party that are probably not useful or cost-effective.
Instead, when the senior secured party has failed to perfect
the rule should be as follows: The senior security interest should
be avoided, and the senior secured party should be demoted to a
general creditor of the debtor. a17  The avoided lien should be pre-
served for the bankrupt estate, so that the trustee can assert the
lien's priority under the subordination agreement.179 The amount
recovered from the collateral by the preserved senior lien is added
to the debtor's estate. The junior creditor receives exactly what it
would have received if the senior creditor had perfected its lien.180
Meanwhile, the duty to perfect stays with each individual secured
party. Under such a rule, the junior secured party has no need to
look over the senior secured party's shoulder to ascertain the state
of perfection of the senior lien.' 8 '
178. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1982).
179. Id. § 551.
180. This should have been the result in In re Tele/Resources, Inc., 724 F.2d 266 (2d
Cir. 1983). Instead, the Second Circuit permitted the senior secured party's unperfected
security interest to survive the debtor's bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court opinion sets
forth a more explicit equation of lien subordination and assignment. 21 Bankr. 358, 363-64
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. (1982).
181. When only the junior and senior secured parties hold liens, lien subordination
looks much like waiver by the junior creditor, without any derivation of senior rights from
the junior security agreement. But what happens when a third lien creditor that is not the
beneficiary of the lien subordination agreement is in the picture? For example, suppose A, a
secured party, is senior to B, a lien creditor. To induce C to make a new secured loan, A
subordinates his lien to a new lien for C created by the debtor. Now A is senior to B, B is
senior to C, and C is senior to A. See Grise v. White, 247 N.E.2d 385 (Mass. 1969).
The standard solution to this circular priority is for C to take priority first over B, but
only to the extent of A's priority over B. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 7, § 39.1, at 1021. But
allowing C to assert A's priority is still a waiver by A, not an assignment of A's rights to C.
A stands aside for C, but A continues to screen out B until C has satisfied its claim, up to
A's priority. When A can stand aside no longer, B's turn comes to satisfy its claim. The
point is that C enforces its own security interest granted by the debtor and does not step
into A's shoes.
In Grise v. White the court was able to award priority to C over B without analyzing
the lien subordination agreement as an assignment. 247 N.E.2d at 390.
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V. THE JUNIOR CREDITOR'S DUTY To PRESERVE THE JUNIOR DEBT
A. Destruction of the Junior Debt by Payment or Discharge
Complete subordination of debt equates with assignment of
bankruptcy dividends. The converse also follows. Every express as-
signment of bankruptcy dividends includes the promise not to re-
ceive payment after the debtor's bankruptcy. After the debtor has
notice of an assignment, only payments to the senior creditor as-
signee extinguish the debt. The rule that an assignor impliedly
promises to do nothing to defeat the assignment supports this
rule.182 If the junior debt could be extinguished with surreptitious
postbankruptcy payments, the double dividends disappear, and
the junior creditor will have violated its duty to do nothing to de-
feat the assignment.
In the above discussion, bankruptcy triggered the junior credi-
tor's implied duty not to receive payments. The question arises
whether courts should imply a duty on the junior creditor not to
receive prebankruptcy payments.
Initially, the Second Circuit did imply a duty not to receive
prebankruptcy payments. In Cherno v. Dutch American Mercan-
tile Corp.183 a secured creditor promised a prospective new creditor
(a) to subordinate its llen to the lien of the junior creditor, and (b)
to receive no payment on the junior debt until the senior debt was
paid fully. The senior creditor never took a lien of its own, and
never filed notice of an assignment of the junior creditor's chattel
mortgage. The junior creditor then dishonestly filed a statement of
satisfaction, which led a third secured creditor to extend credit in
exchange for a chattel mortgage. The senior creditor maintained
that the false statement of satisfaction was void because the secur-
ity interest already had been assigned by the time of the false
statement. The court properly held that the senior creditor's as-
signment was unperfected and ineffective against the third secured
creditor.1 84
The Second Circuit's dictum suggested that the junior creditor
breached some kind of duty to the senior creditor when it filed the
182. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 333(1)(a) (1979).
183. 353 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1965). Cherno has been discussed for its alternate holding
that subordinations are not assignments. See supra text accompanying note 85.
184. 353 F.2d at 154. Cherno concerned precode law. Article 9 does not govern fraudu-
lent statements of satisfaction, but Professor Epstein has urged the same result under the
UCC. Epstein, supra note 112, at 528-29.
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false statement of satisfaction. 85 Although the court did not justify
this statement, the court appeared to believe that the senior credi-
tor had a right to the preservation of the security interest. This
view is consistent with the principle that junior creditors should
hold improper payments before bankruptcy for the benefit of the
senior creditor. 86 Thus, the Cherno court must have viewed the
chattel mortgage as already held "in trust" for the senior credi-
tor.187 Incidentally, this dictum undermines the court's insistence
that subordinations are not assignments.'88
The prebankruptcy duty to preserve the collateral arose from
the complete subordination, not the assignment of bankruptcy div-
idends implied by the complete subordination. That is, the com-
plete subordination, effective by its terms before bankruptcy, im-
plied a duty to hold the security interest in trust for the senior
creditor. This duty does not arise when there is no promise to
forego prebankruptcy payment.
The issue whether a duty to preserve collateral should be im-
plied in the absence of a promise to forego prebankruptcy pay-
ments arose obliquely in First National Bank v. American Foam
Rubber Corp.8" The case concerned complete subordination simi-
lar to Cherno. The junior creditors had promised to receive no
principal or interest payments on their debentures until the senior
creditors' debentures were paid in full. The junior creditors had
agreed to surrender such improper payments to the senior credi-
tors.190 The court's holding-against any implied duty to preserve
the senior debt-related to the implied assignment of bankruptcy
dividends, not the promise to forego prebankruptcy payment.
In 1958, after the complete subordination agreement went into
effect, the American Foam Rubber Corporation decided to ex-
change shares of its stock for a junior creditor's subordinated de-
bentures. Three years later, American Foam Rubber became bank-
185. "[The senior creditor] at no time had an interest in or lien upon the chattels. Its
so-called 'security' was nothing more than a promise by [the junior creditor] to apply no
payment against the mortgage debt until [the senior creditor] was paid in full. [The junior
creditor] breached this agreement . . . ." 353 F.2d at 154.
186. At one point, the Second Circuit stated that the junior creditor holds the entire
junior debt in trust for the senior creditor-that is, the junior debt is the property of the
senior creditor. Id. The court does not say expressly that the security interest is held in
trust as if it were an "improper payment." See supra text accompanying notes 62-71.
187. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
188. 353 F.2d at 151.
189. 306 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd in part, 530 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976).
190. 306 F. Supp. at 599-601.
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rupt. The senior creditor received some dividends in bankruptcy,
but did not receive the "double dividends" he would have received
if the junior creditor had remained a subordinated lender instead
of becoming a shareholder. The senior creditor alleged that the
junior creditor had breached her contract by discharging a subordi-
nated loan in exchange for stock. The district court ruled that the
junior creditor would be liable for wrongfully depriving the senior
creditor of double dividends in bankruptcy. The court analyzed the
transaction as a "complete subordination" so that any "payment"
was a breach of the contract for which the senior creditor had the
right to recover damages. But, the trade of the junior creditor's
subordinated debentures for the preferred stock was not consid-
ered a payment in violation of the complete subordination agree-
ment because no assets left the firm as a result of the trade.191
The district court and the court of appeals disagreed on the
effect of discharging the subordinated loan. The district court
ruled that the subordination agreement included not only an im-
plied assignment of bankruptcy dividends to the senior creditor,
but also an implied promise not to discharge the subordinated
debt. The district judge inferred this promise in order to preserve
the senior creditor's right to receive double dividends.192 The
judge's inference relied squarely on the dictum in Cherno. He read
Cherno to mean that any discharge of junior debt violates a duty
implied into all subordinations.193
191. Id. The Second Circuit agreed. 530 F.2d at 452-53. The district court equated the
trade for stock with "waiver, forgiveness or cancellation" of the junior debt. 306 F. Supp. at
601. Even though the preferred shares had a five percent cumulative dividend and were
redeemable at will by American Foam Rubber, the court noted that the defendants never
could receive cash for their shares. Under the terms of the preferred share issue, payments
could not occur until the senior debentures were paid. Id. at 600. The district court knew
that dividends and redemption could occur during a period of temporary solvency between
payments on plaintiff's debenture, but the issuance of stock was still not a "payment" be-
cause "it was highly improbable that [the defendant] would realize any cash. . . by means
of the exchange." Id.
192. 306 F. Supp. at 605-06. Apparently, this damage theory was the idea of the dis-
trict court judge. The junior creditor tried unsuccessfully to claim that the appeals court
could not consider the theory because the senior creditor did not plead it. 530 F.2d at 453
n.3.
193. Cherno did not deal with destruction of double dividends. The junior debt in
Cherno continued to exist and the parties believed it would generate double dividends. The
case dealt with turning over trust property-a payment inconsistent with the complete sub-
ordination promise-to the senior creditor, not with discharging the junior debt, which
would have destroyed double dividends. Nevertheless, the analogy to discharge of the junior
debt is apt. The junior creditor must do no act to destroy the subordination once it has
become enforceable.
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The Second Circuit decided against broadly implying duties to
preserve junior debt for the life of the subordination and reasoned:
It requires little imagination to conceive of the discharge of a subordinated
debt many years prior to bankruptcy, or, indeed, without any subsequent
bankruptcy ever taking place. If the decision appealed from is correct, such
discharge would nonetheless be a breach of the subordination agreement, be-
cause of the remote chance that bankruptcy might someday occur and the
senior creditor might thereafter be deprived of a double dividend. We think
that if the senior creditor would prohibit a discharge because of such remote
contingencies, he should so provide in the subordination agreement."1
4
This holding is correct respecting the typical contingent subordina-
tion, especially when the parties provide and expect outright pay-
ment before bankruptcy. Under these agreements, discharge by
forgiveness cannot be a breach of contract when discharge by pay-
ment is acceptable.
But a complete subordination agreement does not preserve
prebankruptcy freedom. Discharge by forgiveness is an extraordi-
nary event. The effect of discharge is to enrich the debtor, and
hence the general creditors in bankruptcy, and to deny double div-
idends to the senior creditor. 195 Implying a duty against outright
forgiveness either preserves double dividends or forces the debtor
to make some sort of payment, such as an illegal prebankruptcy
payment of bankruptcy dividends, that benefits the senior
creditor.196
In any event, contrary to the assumption of the district court
and the Second Circuit, American Foam Rubber was hardly a for-
giveness case. The junior creditors received stock in exchange for
the debt. Both courts viewed the issuance of stock as no payment
and hence no violation of the complete subordination promise.
197
194. 530 F.2d at 456 (footnotes omitted).
195. Sometimes forgiveness of debt is described as a conveyance from the creditor to
the debtor. In re Assoc. Gas & Elec. Co., 61 F. Supp. 11, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 149 F.2d
946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945); cf. In re Abramson, 715 F.2d 934 (5th Cir.
1983) (debtor who released option to buy equipment held to have made a transfer). If this
premise is accepted, a discharge of the junior debt by forgiveness is similar to an assignment
of a debt a second time. If the first assignment is perfected under Article 9 (when applica-
ble) or under the common law of assignments, the forgiveness (i.e., the second assignment)
is not good against the first assignee. Under this theory, the senior creditor remains entitled
to double dividends in the common debtor's bankruptcy in spite of the forgiveness.
196. The parties usually will define the length of complete subordinations carefully
because they are drastic promises. Therefore, an implied duty against discharge is not a
long-term disability upon the junior creditor. It is more palatable than implying the duty in
contingent subordinations in which classes of senior creditors may exist forever. See supra
notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
197. Accord, Calligar, supra note 5, at 399.
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The basis for this view was that no assets left the debtor's estate
when stock was issued.198 Nevertheless, the stock was proceeds of
the debt with a positive market value and should have been
deemed an improper payment to be held for the senior creditor. 199
Readers will recognize in this discussion an important point
for convertible debt securities 200 or for debt-equity swaps in which
the debt is subordinated. 20 1 Because the stock is proceeds of the
junior debt, issued in satisfaction of it, the stock should be deemed
"trust property" held for senior creditors.20 2
198. 306 F. Supp. at 601; 530 F.2d at 452-53. The court's characterization of "no pay-
ment" rested heavily upon the finding that the stock was "unlikely" to generate cash divi-
dends. Hence, its holding that issuance of stock is not payment must be limited to stock
that cannot generate dividends during the life of the subordination promise. See supra note
191.
199. A distinction should be made between property received from the debtor in satis-
faction of the debt-such as stock in a debt-equity swap-and the sales price received when
the subordinated claim is sold to someone other than the debtor. Sale of the debt itself is
not payment because the junior debt is not extinguished when it is sold. Double dividends
are preserved, so that the senior creditors have little reason to protest the sale of the junior
debt after an event of subordination has occurred. Nevertheless, if Article 9 applies, the
technical definition of proceeds is such that the sales price of the junior debt falls within it.
U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1977); see supra text accompanying notes 142-53.
200. Most recently issued convertible debentures are subordinated. Bratton, supra
note 16, at 673. The conversion privilege usually belongs to the junior creditor, and the
economics disfavor conversion in a time of financial difficulty. Id. at 672-80. Nevertheless,
this is not always the case. In the gigantic Associated Gas & Electric bankruptcy in the
1940s, the issuer held the conversion privilege and actually exercised it in hard times. In -re
Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 61 F. Supp. 11, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), af'd, 149 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945); Elias v. Clarke, 143 F.2d 640, 642 n.1, 645-46 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 778 (1944).
201. Corporations that have issued long-term debt at low interest rates may be
tempted to swap stock for debt at discounted prices. The difference between the value of
the stock and the face amount of the debt must be characterized as income. I.R.C. §
108(e)(10)(A). Before 1984, however, there was a flat income exclusion for all debt-equity
swaps. See generally Bryan, Cancellation of Indebtedness by Issuing Stock in Exchange:
Challenging the Congressional Solution to Debt-Equity Swaps, 63 Tx. L. REV. 89 (1984).
The effect of swapping debt for stock is an instant increase in the reported value of the
issuer. Id. at 90. Stock traded to junior creditors who have promised to receive no payment
should be deemed held in trust for senior creditors. Under the American Foam Rubber'
rationale, the junior creditors could keep the stock.
202. Compare Original ABA Model Indenture, § 14-2(c) (securities issued after event
of subordination to be issued to senior creditors) with Model Simplified Indenture, supra
note 15, § 11.04 (capital stock issued in exchange for subordinated debenture may be re-
tained by junior creditors). The Original ABA Model Indenture has optional language per-
mitting the common debtor's bankruptcy court to issue postbankruptcy securities pursuant
to a plan that recognizes the subordinated nature of the junior creditor's claim. Original
ABA Model Indenture commentaries, at 570.
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B. Secured Subordinated Debt
Two of the leading debt subordination cases in the Second
Circuit concerned secured claims subordinated to unsecured
claims. In the first case, Cherno v. Dutch American Mercantile
Corp.,2o3 the junior creditor held the security at the time it exe-
cuted a debt subordination agreement that was effective immedi-
ately. The Second Circuit ruled that subordination was not assign-
ment. Therefore, it refused to apply the rule that security
automatically travels with the assigned debt. This ruling defeats
the purpose of subordination and raises the cost of subordinated
lending.20 4
An entirely different set of facts occurred in Allegaert v.
Chemical Bank.20 5 The junior creditor took a security interest in a
debtor asset when it was free to accept precontingency payments.
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling that the se-
curity interest was a voidable preference. The case was settled
before the real merits could be reached.20 6 The security interest
should have been equated with payment. Because payment was
proper, the security interest was proper. The court should not have
deemed the security interest trust property held for the senior
creditors.
Thus, in Cherno the security interest should have been trans-
ferred to the senior creditors, but in Allegaert it should not have
been transferred. The distinction lies with the purpose of the two
subordination agreements. A secured creditor that subordinates its
debt, effective immediately, promises nothing if it is allowed to re-
alize upon its security. The alternative, allowing the security inter-
est to lie fallow, grants a free ride to nonsenior creditors that were
not intended to be benefited. Instead, the security interest should
be frozen until the debtor's bankruptcy or until the end of the
complete subordination agreement. If the debtor liquidates, then
the efficient result is to view the security interest as transferred
over to senior creditors. This solution comports with the express
promise not to receive payment before bankruptcy and with the
principle that only the seniors should get subordination benefits
when the debtor liquidates.0 7
203. 353 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1965).
204. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
205. 657 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'g 454 F. Supp. 341 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
206. Letter from James F. Gleason, Jr. (July 30, 1984) (on file).
207. See generally supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
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In Allegaert the junior creditor received security on antece-
dent debt at a time when payment was proper. If actual payment
had been received, then the senior creditors could not have ob-
jected. The security interest benefited senior creditors more than
payment because the debtor was able to retain the income from
the pledged asset until an event of default under the pledge agree-
ment. The junior creditor should be able to receive security when
it can receive payment, even if liquidation of the collateral occurs
at a time when payment on the junior debt would have been
improper.2 08
Allegaert does not alter the conclusion that the rules for as-
signment fit well in the subordination context. The rule that an
assignment carries the corresponding debt and security is a rule
invented for assignments that permit the assignee to collect imme-
diately. The Allegaert case dealt with an assignment in which the
assignor could collect on the obligation until default. If the as-
signor can destroy the collateral by collecting, it must follow that it
can destroy the asset by taking security. A contingent subordina-
tion of secured debt, then, is no more than a subordination of the
208. Some contractual language in Allegaert arguably is contrary to this conclusion.
Paragraph 3.2 of the subordination clause states:
BANK agrees that it is not taking and will not take or assert as security for the pay-
ment of the Note or the payment of interest thereon any security interest in or lien
upon . . . any property of BORROWER.. . which is or at any time may be in the
possession or subject to the control of BANK.
657 F.2d at 499 n.1. This provision could be read as an express promise not to receive secur-
ity interest, which, according to First Nat'l Bank v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d
450, 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976), is fully enforceable. The American
Foam Rubber court stated that "if the senior creditor would prohibit a discharge because of
such remote contingencies, he should so provide in the subordination agreement." Id.
The Allegaert court, however, noted that the common debtor and junior creditor
amended the above language out of existence by executing a subsequent pledge agreement.
657 F.2d at 505; see id. at 499-500 n.3 (junior creditor never promised not to make amend-
ments). The junior creditor had complete power to receive total payment. Therefore, the
promise not to receive security is highly inconsistent with the contingent nature of the jun-
ior creditor's obligation.
The parties probably intended the antipledge language from the original loan agree-
ment to prevent the junior creditor from claiming any setoffs or cross-collateral agreements
as security for the subordinated loan. The consequence of this junior creditor power would
have been the debtor's loss of a significant accounting advantage. As a stockbroker with net
capital requirements, the debtor could have improved its net capital ratio by excluding sub-
ordinated debt from its liabilities. If the junior creditor could claim any kind of setoff or
other collateral, however, the accounting advantage would have been lost. The execution of
the pledge agreement meant that the debtor wished to surrender the accounting advantage.
Because the junior creditors could be defeated by payment, there was no compelling reason
to read the antipledge language as a promise that the senior creditors have standing to
enforce.
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unsecured deficit that the debtor owes the junior creditors. 20 9
In summary, American Foam Rubber and, perhaps, Allegaert
stand for extensive freedom in the junior creditor and debtor to
destroy the junior debt by modification of the loan agreement be-
tween the junior creditor and the debtor. Only if the junior credi-
tor expressly has promised not to take the action in question does
the senior creditor have grounds to protect its rights. If a subordi-
nation agreement permits the junior creditor to take preban-
kruptcy payments, it is possible for the junior creditor and the
common debtor to repeal the subordination agreement over the
protests of the senior creditors.210 Certainly the junior creditor
209. The analysis must change if Article 9 applies. Under § 9-306, the secured party
has an interest in any proceeds of the collateral. Proceeds would include any payment re-
ceived on the junior claim, even if the payment is prior to a subordination contingency.
Thus, any security interest received on the junior debt constitutes proceeds as well. This is
an additional reason why Article 9 should not apply to subordination. In a contingent subor-
dination, the parties provide for the amortization of the asset pledged to the senior credi-
tors. Article 9 proceeds theory simply interferes with this expectation.
210. A recent case has held to the contrary, but did not justify this result. Weisman v.
Goss, 694 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1982).
In Weisman, A held both stock and subordinated debt of the common debtor. A sold
the securities to B on credit, in exchange for a purchase money security interest in the
securities. B then sold its equity in the securities back to the common debtor, also on credit,
apparently when the debtor was solvent. In exchange the debtor gave B an unsubordinated
promissory note. This unsubordinated note constituted proceeds of A's collateral, and hence
A had a security interest in both the unsubordinated note and the subordinated debt.
The debtor filed for bankruptcy. A made a claim on both the pledged subordinated
debt, the equity of which was owned by the debtor, and the unsubordinated note, the equity
of which was owned by B. The court of appeals affirmed an order subordinating A's claim on
the unsubordinated note.
To the extent the unsubordinated note represented the price of the common debtor's
stock, the court based subordination of the note on what appears to be a fraudulent convey-
ance theory. 694 F.2d at 181. One would have thought that because the note was issued
when the company was solvent, the note was not fraudulent as to other creditors.
The Weisman court, however, cited McConnell v. Estate of Butler, 402 F.2d 362, 366
(9th Cir. 1968), for the proposition that solvency must be judged when the note actually is
paid, not when it is issued. 694 F.2d at 179. McConnell was based upon a linguistic quirk in
California's capital surplus statute. Its use in a case out of Hawaii seems dubious, unless the
debtor was a California corporation.
McConnell dealt with the exchange of stock for unsubordinated debt and hence did not
apply to that part of the common debtor's unsubordinated note that represented an ex-
change for subordinated debt. The court therefore had to fend for itself in deciding whether
subordinated debt could be exchanged for unsubordinated debt. This part of the court's
opinion contradicts the statement in the text of this Article. The court's solution is incom-
prehensible and any exegesis is treacherous. The exact "rationale," therefore, is set forth in
full:
McConnell is generally not applicable when a corporation issues new debt instru-
ments in exchange for previously issued debt.
That rule does not apply to any portion of the [unsubordinated] notes, however.
To understand why this is so it must be remembered that when [A] sold [subordi-
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could accept a complete repayment and then lend the money back
on an unsubordinated basis. Simple repeal of the subordination
clause achieves the same goal with less paperwork.
Therefore, the American Foam Rubber opinion illustrates that
many contingent subordinations are practically worthless until the
subordination contingency actually occurs. When the junior credi-
tor is in a position to collude with the common debtor, it can es-
cape its subordination obligations altogether, unless the subordina-
nated] notes to [B] they remained as collateral a security interest in those notes. The
subsequent sale by [B] to [the common debtor] was made subject to this security inter-
est of [A]. Both the trustee and the district court fully acknowledge the legitimacy and
priority of [A's] security interest in the [subordinated] notes. The claim which this
interest represents has not been subordinated.
Because [the debtor] remains liable to [A] on the [subordinated] notes, the issu-
ance by [the debtor] of the [unsubordinated] notes and [B's] pledge to appellants of a
portion of those notes resulted in enhancing [A's] security with respect to the [subordi-
nated] notes. It would be improper to provide [A] at the expense of the other creditors
two unsubordinated claims when in fact one adequately represents the value of the
property given in exchange for the claims. The situation might be different if new and
additional value had been given by [A] exchange for the [unsubordinated] notes. This
was not the case, however.
694 F.2d at 181-82 (emphasis added). The bizarre result here is that the court subordinated
the unsubordinated note owned by B and pledged to A, but it desubordinated the subordi-
nated note owned by the common debtor and pledged to A. Furthermore, the court would
have allowed the unsubordinated note to be asserted in full if A had given B new value for
the note.
The Weisman court should have inquired whether the note was wholly or partly a
fraudulent convenyance. It should have upheld exchange of the note by the common debtor
for its own stock vis-a-vis other creditors if the common debtor was solvent at the time.
Similarly, exchange of the unsubordinated note for the subordinated debt clearly was not
fraudulent to creditors generally, if it was for fair consideration or if the trade took place
when the debtor was solvent.
Separate from fraudulent conveyance considerations, the court should have investigated
whether the trade of the note for the subordinated debt violated the contractual rights of
the senior creditors. If the subordinated debt could have been prepaid at the time it was
exchanged for unsubordinated debt, the exchange was not a breach of contract. Even if it
was a breach of contract, A should have had an unsubordinated claim against the common
debtor under these circumstances. The only consequence of the breach of contract is
whether the unsubordinated note is an "improper payment" held for the senior creditors,
see supra text accompanying notes 60-69, or whether A could retain the bankruptcy divi-
dends on this note for himself.
Under no circumstances should A be able to desubordinate the subordinated debt sim-
ply because A held the subordinated debt as collateral for B's obligation to A. But a serious
caveat is in order. Hawaii has not passed the proposed § 1-209 of the UCC, which exempts
subordination from Article 9 coverage. Under the Article 9 priorities, the first secured party
to perfect or file wins. UCC § 9-312(5) (1977). B, as purchaser of the subordinated claim,
had knowledge of the senior creditors' security interest and so was junior to the senior credi-
tors. Id. § 9-301(1)(c). But A was a secured party that perfected before the senior creditors.
Under this reasoning, the court did properly desubordinate the claim.
The Weisman decision proves that courts should declare by fiat that Article 9 does not
apply to subordination of debt. See supra text accompanying notes 142-46.
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tion agreement contains express limitations on the right of the
junior creditor to accept accelerated prebankruptcy payments.
Without this limitation, the subordinated loan always can be re-
paid and replaced by an unsubordinated loan.
The opportunity to refinance subordinated debt is not neces-
sarily a negative development. Unsubordinated debt draws lower
interest rates than subordinated debt. The ability to refinance
without the senior creditors' consent is entirely proper when the
chances of the debtor's liquidation are low. Nevertheless, senior
creditors that place high value on their right to double dividends
should realize that, unless subordination covenants are supple-
mented with a covenant against paying the junior debt, their sub-
ordination rights can be repealed without their consent.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that debt subordination can be under-
stood as the junior creditor's promise not to receive payment after
a designated time until the named senior creditors have been paid.
All of the other common features of the standard form subordina-
tion agreements are derivable from this promise. Among these fea-
tures is the assignment of bankruptcy dividends from the junior
creditor to the senior creditor. This concept suggests a proprietary
claim of the senior creditors in an asset of the junior creditor.
In addition, lien priority subordination should be distin-
guished as a different agreement altogether. The junior creditor
does not promise that it will not receive payment in satisfaction of
its claim. As a result, lien subordination is not an assignment. Sug-
gestions to the contrary could lead to secret liens in the debtor's
bankruptcy.
Finally, subordination prior to the contingency on which it de-
pends is a worthless right unless supplemented with further cove-
nants restricting the right to prepay the junior claim. Closely re-
lated to the dubious value of precontingency subordination is the
concept of secured subordinated debt. When payment is permit-
ted, the junior creditor should be able to accept collateral to secure
the junior debt. This collateral is held solely for the junior creditor.
If payment would not have been permitted, then the security inter-
est received by the junior creditor should be deemed held for the
benefit of the senior creditors.
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